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Abstract
While a number of empirical studies have documented benefits of lending relationships to bor-
rowers (lower loan rates, better credit availability, etc.), not much is known about benefits of such
relationships for lenders. For a relationship lender, its comparative advantage in information gath-
ering/processing yields two potential benefits. First, a relationship lender would have a higher prob-
ability of selling future information-sensitive products (e.g. loans, security underwriting, etc.) to its
borrowers compared to a non-relationship lender. We refer to this as higher volume benefit of re-
lationship lending. Second, if borrower-specific information is only available to relationship lender,
it can use this information monopoly to charge higher rates on future loans. We refer to this as
increased pricing benefit of relationship lending. Our results show that, on average, a lender with a
past relationship with a borrower has a 42% probability of providing it with future loans, while a
lender lacking a past relationship with a borrower has only a 3% probability of providing it with a
future loan. Consistent with theory, we find that borrowers with greater information asymmetries
(e.g. small borrowers, or non-rated borrowers) are significantly more likely to use their relationship
banks for future loans. Although the association between past lending relationship and probability of
being chosen to provide debt and equity underwriting services in the future is statistically significant,
the economic impact is much smaller compared to loan markets. However, our findings do not pro-
vide strong support for an increased pricing benefit for relationship lenders. On average, the rate of
interest for similar borrowers is 6-10 basis points lower if the loan is provided by a relationship lender.
Underwriting fee for initial public offerings (IPO) with relationship lender(s) as lead underwriter(s)
is 26 basis points lower. This suggests that lenders are prepared to share some of the benefits of
relationship lending with borrowers.
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So What Do I Get?
The Bank’s View of Lending Relationships
Abstract
While a number of empirical studies have documented benefits of lending relationships
to borrowers (lower loan rates, better credit availability, etc.), not much is known about
benefits of such relationships for lenders. For a relationship lender, its comparative advan-
tage in information gathering/processing yields two potential benefits. First, a relationship
lender would have a higher probability of selling future information-sensitive products (e.g.
loans, security underwriting, etc.) to its borrowers compared to a non-relationship lender.
We refer to this as higher volume benefit of relationship lending. Second, if borrower-
specific information is only available to relationship lender, it can use this information
monopoly to charge higher rates on future loans. We refer to this as increased pricing
benefit of relationship lending. Our results show that, on average, a lender with a past
relationship with a borrower has a 42% probability of providing it with future loans, while
a lender lacking a past relationship with a borrower has only a 3% probability of providing
it with a future loan. Consistent with theory, we find that borrowers with greater infor-
mation asymmetries (e.g. small borrowers, or non-rated borrowers) are significantly more
likely to use their relationship banks for future loans. Although the association between
past lending relationship and probability of being chosen to provide debt and equity un-
derwriting services in the future is statistically significant, the economic impact is much
smaller compared to loan markets. However, our findings do not provide strong support
for an increased pricing benefit for relationship lenders. On average, the rate of interest
for similar borrowers is 6-10 basis points lower if the loan is provided by a relationship
lender. Underwriting fee for initial public offerings (IPO) with relationship lender(s) as
lead underwriter(s) is 26 basis points lower. This suggests that lenders are prepared to
share some of the benefits of relationship lending with borrowers.
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1 Introduction
The special nature of lending relationships has been the subject of extensive theoretical and
empirical research in finance.1 While there is no precise definition of “relationship banking”,
scholars broadly agree that if a financial intermediary’s decision to supply various services to
a firm is based on borrower-specific information that the intermediary collects over multiple
interactions (over time as well as across multiple products) and if this information is proprietary
(available only to the borrower and the intermediary), the intermediary is engaged in relationship
banking (for detailed discussion see Berger (1999) and Boot (2000)). Existing theories predict
that establishment of strong lender-borrower relationships can generate significant benefits for
the lender.2
Empirical evidence on the benefits of banking relationships has largely focused on document-
ing these benefits to the borrower. This literature can be broadly classified into two distinct
approaches. The first approach uses indirect tests to establish the value of banking relation-
ships. Specifically, James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) find positive stock market
reaction to the renewal of lending relationships thus establishing the value-enhancement role of
relationships to borrowers.3 The second approach attempts to estimate the effects of relation-
ships on borrowers directly by examining the impact that such relationships have on the cost
and availability of credit. This approach is best characterized by Petersen and Rajan (1994)
and Berger and Udell (1995). They find, among other things, that the stronger (i.e. the longer
the duration of) the relationship, the greater is the credit availability and the lower are the
collateral requirements.
Our paper differs from the studies cited above in one critical dimension. Our focus is on
establishing the existence, and the nature, of the benefits of relationship banking from the
1See Boot (2000) and Ongena and Smith (1998) for an extensive survey of this literature.
2The benefits to a borrower could come from multiple sources such as the ability to share sensitive information
(Bhattacharya and Chiesa, (1995)); more flexible contracts compared to public debt (Berlin and Mester (1992),
Boot, Greenbuam, and Thakor (1993)); the ability to monitor collateral (Rajan and Winton (1995)); and the
ability to smooth out loan pricing over multiple loans (Berlin and Mester (1998)). Another source of benefits
for a relationship lender can arise due to potential monopoly power (holdup power) of the lender (e.g. Sharpe
(1990) and Rajan (1992)) allowing lender to charge excessive rates for loans to its captive borrowers. Berlin
(1996) provides a good overview of these issues of relationship lending.
3Further evidence is provided by Slovin, Shushka and Polonchek (1993) and Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2003)
who document a negative impact of the potential termination of lending relationships on the borrower’s market
value. Ongena, Smith and Michalsen (2003) report similar results for capital constrained Norwegian borrowers
when banks of such borrowers faced distress.
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perspective of the lender, a subject that has attracted far less attention in the literature. Indeed,
relationship studies do not provide any guidance on what are the sources of these benefits
to lenders and how the value created by establishing such relationships is shared by lenders
and borrowers.4 Thus an important question is - what is the value of establishing a lending
relationship to a lender (rather than a borrower)?
Existing theories of financial intermediation (see, e.g., Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond
(1984), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor(1984)) emphasize the information production role of
banks through screening (Diamond (1991)) and subsequently through monitoring (Rajan and
Winton (1995)). Typically, relationship lending involves repeated interaction between a lender
and a borrower over time. Such interactions generate “inside information” for the lender and
could reduce its cost of providing further loans and other services.5 If relationship lending
produces reusable and proprietary information about the borrower, a possible benefit for the
relationship lender is that it would be better placed to win future loan business and other fee-
generating services from its relationship borrower.6 While the association between past lending
relationships and winning future investment banking business has been examined recently by
Drucker and Puri (2004) (for SEOs) and Yasuda (2004) (for public debt underwriting), as far
as we are aware, no study has examined the impact of lending relationships on ability to win
future loan business. Our paper provides tests that examine whether establishing a lending
relationship translates into a higher probability of winning future lending as well as non-lending
business for a lender.
The central result of this paper is that strong past lending relationships significantly increase
the probability of getting future lending and investment banking business. Holding all else
constant, a bank with a prior lending relationship has more than a 40% probability of winning
4One study that has attempted to indirectly measure the relationship benefits to the lenders is Dahiya,
Saunders and Srinivasan (2003). They find that a bank’s share price drops when its borrower announces default.
The stock price drop is much greater when the borrower has had an ongoing relationship with the bank, signalling
that potential termination of the relationship also results in loss of value to the bank.
5Petersen and Rajan (1994) provide a succinct description of this argument: “. . . if scale economies exist in
information production, and information is durable and not easily transferable, these theories suggest that a firm
with close ties to financial institutions should have a lower cost of capital . . . Implicit, therefore, in our analysis
is the assumption that reductions in lender’s cost are passed on to the borrower in a lower rate”.
6Reasons as to why a relationship lender would incur lower information production costs are discussed by
Petersen and Rajan (1994). They argue that a relationship lender acquires information about its borrower over
time that would be costly for a new lender to acquire, thus giving the relationship lender a cost advantage. Also,
if fixed costs of producing information can be spread over multiple products, the marginal cost of providing any
individual product would be lower for a relationship lender.
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subsequent loan business from its borrower while a bank lacking such a relationship has only
a 3% probability of being chosen to provide future loans. Consistent with theory, borrowers
suffering from greater information asymmetry (e.g. small, non-rated firms) are more likely to
use their relationship lender for future loans. Moreover, on average, a prior lender is almost twice
as likely to be retained as the lead debt underwriter by its (loan) borrowers. While the impact
of a prior lending relationship has a limited effect on the choice of an SEO (Seasoned Equity
Offering) underwriter, the existence of a past lending relationship is associated with almost a
four-fold increase in the probability of being retained as a lead IPO (Initial Public Offering)
underwriter by a relationship borrower. To the extent that an increase in future lending and
underwriting business is profitable, a greater likelihood of winning future business is a significant
benefit to a relationship lender.
Further benefits for a relationship lender arise if it is able to charge higher prices (or economic
rents) for loans. This is likely to occur if the borrower is unable to communicate its quality
(which is only known to its relationship lender) to other lenders. Rajan (1992) and Sharpe
(1990) point out that a relationship lender can exert monopoly power over its borrower and
extract rents through higher prices for future loans. However, under certain conditions this
rent extraction by a relationship lender may not take place. Sharpe argues banks may invest in
building their reputation as “non-exploiting” lenders (to attract future borrowers) by choosing
not to charge higher rates to captive borrowers. If the benefits from such reputation building
are large enough, relationship banks may not exploit their monopoly power over relationship
borrowers. An incumbent bank’s monopoly power would also be eroded if borrowers can credibly
signal their quality (Sharpe (1990)), if borrowers maintain multiple lending relationships (Rajan
(1992)), and/or if the lender is constrained by loan commitments (Houston and Venkataraman
(1994)). Thus, the predicted impact of strong relationships on the prices charged on future
transactions is ambiguous and is an interesting empirical question that has not been tested
extensively.7 In this paper, we test if relationship lending is associated with higher prices of
future loans and services. Our main results show that relationship loans carry lower costs.
While equity underwriting fees are lower for IPOs, fees are not significantly different across
relationship and non-relationship borrowers for SEOs. However, fees for debt underwriting
are higher for relationship borrowers. These high fees, however, can reflect compensation for
7For a sample of Belgian firms, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find that while the loan rate increases as
the duration of a bank-firm relationship increases (proxy for strengthening of relationship), if the scope of the
banking relationship, defined as the purchase of other information-sensitive products from a bank, also increases
it results in a significant decrease in the borrower’s interest rate.
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obtaining better pricing for debt issues (Gande et al. (1997)). Overall, our findings do not
suggest pervasive rent extraction by relationship lenders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe our main hypotheses in
Section 2. Section 3 describes the data and sample selection process. The methodology and
major results are presented in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Theoretical Predictions and Test Hypotheses
In this section we discuss testable predictions of existing theories of relationship lending and
the main hypotheses that we test in this paper. The hypotheses tested in this paper can be
broadly classified into two sets; the first set of hypotheses (hypotheses H1, H2 and H3) examine
the benefits of relationship lending that accrue from efficiency in information production that
a relationship lender enjoys. These hypotheses predict that a relationship lender is more likely
to get future business than a non-relationship lender. We refer to these collectively as “higher
business volume benefits”. The second set of hypotheses (hypotheses H4, and H5) examines
whether a relationship lender uses its private information based monopoly power to extract
rents from its borrower through higher prices on subsequent loans and financial services. We
refer to these collectively as “increased pricing benefits”.
As discussed in the introduction, theoretical models view a key source of the benefits arising
from strong relationships as those which accrue from economies of scale in information produc-
tion. If there are fixed costs of information production and if this information is proprietary
and reusable, theory suggests that strong relationships would be associated with a lower cost of
information production for subsequent lending and service provision decisions (see Greenbaum
and Thakor (1995)). A testable implication is that a relationship lender is more likely to capture
the future lending business of its borrower.8 We formalize this implication in our hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1 (H1) The stronger the bank-borrower relationship, the greater is the probability
of a lender attracting future lending business from that borrower.
The choice between bank debt and direct public debt has been the focus of a number of
studies. Rajan (1992) defines bank financing as “inside debt” due to a bank’s better ability to
8Tendency to repeat past relationships is well documented in areas other than lender-borrower context.
Levinthal and Fichman (1988) report that relationships between auditors and clients were more likely to be
renewed as the duration of these relationships increased. Carlton (1986) reports the average duration of buyers
and suppliers relationships in the manufacturing industry typically exceeded five years.
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collect information about its borrower. Conceptually, relationship lending is repeated extensions
of such “informed debt” by the same lender. Public debt, on the other hand, is considered “arms-
length” financing or “outside debt” where lenders do not engage in proprietary information
production. Diamond (1991) argues that borrowers suffering from the most severe information
asymmetries (e.g. small firms with less established repayment histories and/or borrowers with
poorer credit ratings) have the most to gain from the monitoring provided by banks. Such firms
would choose bank financing over public debt financing. Also, Berlin and Mester (1992) suggest
that borrowers with poor credit risk would choose bank loans with stringent covenants (because
renegotiation of these covenants is easier than that for public debt covenants). These models
predict that informationally opaque borrowers would use relationship loans more frequently than
borrowers for whom a substantial amount of information is available publicly. This is captured
in our hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2 (H2) The more informationally opaque a borrower, the greater the likelihood it
will borrow from its relationship lender.
Kanatas and Qi (2003) focus on the benefits of “scope economies” that arise when a single
institution offers both lending and underwriting services. These scope economies arise in their
model when information costs of learning about their customers in the process of supplying one
product, need not be fully incurred again when supplying other products to same customers.9
Petersen and Rajan (1994) also discuss the potential benefits to a relationship lender in gen-
erating enhanced sales of other non-lending products (e.g. investment banking, deposit-related
products, etc.). Such future sales may be a source of value creation since cross-selling multiple
products gives the bank the ability to spread the fixed costs of information production over
multiple products as well as to generate additional revenues.10 This motivates our hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3 (H3) The stronger the bank-borrower relationship, the greater is the probability
a lender will attract future investment banking business from that borrower.
While relationship lending has been portrayed as beneficial to both lenders and their bor-
rowers, its cost to borrowers has also received considerable attention. Sharpe (1990) develops a
theoretical model where lender-borrower relationships arise simply because the borrowers have
9Additionally, these benefits can also arise from “purchasing economies of scope” as outlined in Klemperer
and Padilla (1997) who argue that borrowers prefer a single source of multiple products to lower their transaction
costs.
10That is, the potential for cost and revenue economies of scale.
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been “informationally captured”. High quality borrowers are forced to accept a higher interest
rate from their existing lender as it is difficult for them to convey information about their quality
to other banks. Similarly, if a borrower’s current project succeeds, Rajan (1992) shows that a
relationship lender can extract rents from future projects by demanding a high return. This
holdup possibility can distort the investment decisions of an entrepreneur. Thus, borrowers who
anticipate a sequence of profitable projects (e.g. firms with good future prospects) would prefer
arms-length financing or multiple banking relationships.11 However, both Sharpe and Rajan
discuss conditions that limit or eliminate such rent seeking by a relationship bank. Sharpe
argues that if lenders care about their reputation among potential borrowers, they would not
charge excessive prices to their relationship borrowers. Rajan contrasts the holdup cost of re-
lationship borrowing against its unique benefit of more flexible contracting that is possible and
states “. . . bank debt is easily renegotiated . . . any renegotiation [with an arm’s length creditor ]
suffers from information and free-rider problems.”
Thus, theory offers conflicting predictions about the impact of lending relationships on prices
charged for future loans and service provisions. A relationship lender’s ability to acquire private
information over the course of a relationship can potentially allow it to use this information to
extract (monopoly) rents from its borrower by charging higher rates and fees on future loans and
services. To the extent that these “lock-in” effects are present and dominant, such relationships
would be associated with a higher cost of relationship loans. However, should the benefits
of relationship lending (flexible contracting, lower cost of information gathering, reputation as
non-exploitative lender, etc.) outweigh the costs, and, if a lender shares these benefits with
its borrower, we should expect relationship loans to carry lower costs.12 This is formalized in
hypothesis 4:
Hypothesis 4 (H4) If a relationship lender exploits its monopoly power, the stronger the bank-
borrower relationship, the higher is the All-in-Spread Drawn (AISD)13 charged on future rela-
tionship loans. Alternatively, if the benefits of relationship lending are shared with the borrower,
11Houston and James (1996) find that borrowers with high future growth opportunities rely less on bank fi-
nancing if they have a single banking relationship. They argue this is consistent with hold-up problems associated
with strong lending relationships.
12Lenders may also offer loans as part of a bundle of services where the pricing of each product in the bundle
depends on the price of other bundled products. Here the low cost of loans may imply higher costs for other
products such as underwriting services.
13All-in-Spread Drawn (AISD) measures the interest rate spread on a loan (over LIBOR) plus any associated
fees in originating the loan.
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a stronger bank-borrower relationship would be associated with a lower All-in-Spread Drawn
(AISD) on future loans.
There are conflicting factors that can affect the level of underwriting fees charged by a
relationship lender. As discussed above (see hypothesis 3), if scope economies for information
production are high, the cost of underwriting securities should be lower for a relationship issuer.
To the extent a relationship underwriter shares these cost savings with the issuer, fees for
underwriting should be lower for such issues. However, if the relationship lender holds significant
monopoly power, the charges for underwriting services need not be lower. Also, a relationship
lender can provide credible certification about the quality of the issuer (see Puri (1999)).14 If
an issuer compensates the relationship lender for providing such certification, the underwriting
spreads for issues underwritten by a relationship lender would be higher. This motivates our
hypothesis 5:
Hypothesis 5 (H5) If cost savings in information production are substantial and shared with
the issuer, the underwriting spread charged by a relationship lender would be lower. However, if
the relationship lender exerts monopoly power and/or is compensated for providing certification
of issuer quality, the spreads charged would be higher.
3 Data and Sample Selection
To gain insights into these hypotheses we construct a unique database using three primary data
sources: The Loan Pricing Corporation Dealscan (henceforth, LPC) database,15 a merged CRSP
and COMPUSTAT database and the SDC new securities issues database. As described later
in the paper, the large number of mergers and acquisitions in the US banking sector over our
sample period posed special challenges. To deal with mergers/acquisitions we hand matched
data from the SDC mergers and acquisition database, Lexis-Nexis, and the Hoover’s corporate
histories database to construct a chronology of banking mergers. Since our hypotheses seek to
establish directly measurable benefits of relationships to lenders, the estimation of these benefits
requires data on the following four different dimensions: data to construct meaningful relation-
ship variables; characteristics of lenders; characteristics of each loan facility; and, characteristics
of the borrowers. We discuss each of these four characteristics next in sections 3.1 to 3.4.
14Puri (1996) and Gande et al. (1997) find that the debt underwritten by prior lenders is sold at higher prices.
Schenone (2004) also finds that IPOs underwritten by relationship lenders were valued higher (these issues had
lower underpricing). These studies suggest a strong certification role for relationship lenders.
15The details of data obtained from LPC database are discussed in the following sections.
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3.1 Construction of Relationship Measures
One of the primary goals of this paper is to examine the existence and extent of the benefits
of relationships to lenders. Thus, it is critical to construct meaningful and measurable proxies
for bank relationships as well as their associated benefits. There is no uniformly accepted
methodology for measuring the presence and strength of banking relationships. Where the
precise point of the start of a banking relationship is available, researchers have often used
the length of a relationship as a proxy for its strength (see, for example, Petersen and Rajan
(1994) and Berger and Udell, (1995)). Where this information is not available, the existence of a
prior lending relationship is used as a proxy (see, for example, Dahiya, Srinivasan and Saunders
(2003), Schenone (2004)). All these relationship measures have a potential drawback, which is
if an unobservable characteristic (e.g. physical proximity) that causes a borrower and a lender
to match-up in the first place continues to be present when the borrower seeks subsequent loans
or other banking services. This is a limitation of all relationship measures that are based on
the existence and/or intensity of prior interactions between a borrower and its lender. We try
to mitigate this drawback by including a physical proximity measure, LOCATION (described
later), that controls for locational distance between a borrower and its potential lenders.
To construct the relationship measures, we employed the Loan Pricing Corporation Dealscan
(henceforth, LPC) database. This database contains data on loans made to large publicly traded
companies.16 Our sample period starts in 1986 and ends in March 31, 2001. Since our LPC
database coverage started in 1986, our sample period is truncated in the left tail. Thus, a length
of relationship measure would be biased since we lack a definitive starting date for any such
relationship. Nevertheless, our data set still allows us to construct several other measures that
capture the evolution of the bank-borrower relationship over time. We focus on three distinct
markets in which a relationship lender can benefit from its close ties with its borrower; the
market for bank loans, the market for providing public debt underwriting services, and the
market for providing public equity underwriting services. Since we need to take into account
the historical relationship at the point in time of a particular transaction, we need to construct
these relationship measures for each of the three markets separately. Our methodology for
constructing these measures for each of these markets is described next (Appendix A1 provides
a summary of all the relationship variables and how they are constructed).
16The LPC database is increasingly being employed by researchers examining bank loans. See, for example,
Carey, Post and Sharpe (1998), Strahan (2000), Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2003), and Drucker and Puri
(2004).
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3.1.1 Market for Bank Loans
For every loan facility, we construct three alternative measures of relationship strength by looking
back and searching the past borrowing record of the borrower.17 Thus, for each loan by borrower
i, we look back over a period of 5 years for any previous loans taken by i.18 Based on the banks
retained for these past loans, we construct various relationship measures as discussed below.
For each bank m, we construct a lending relationship measure LOANREL(M)BankLoansm , where
M indicates one of the three alternative measures.
The process is best illustrated by an example: In May 1997, Texas Instruments Inc. borrowed
$600 million from a syndicate led by ABN-AMRO, Citicorp, and Nations Bank. To calculate the
strength of ABN-AMRO’s relationship at the time of this loan we look back on the borrowing
history of Texas Instruments over the 5 years preceding this May 1997 loan. In this window,
the following records of borrowing by Texas Instruments appear in the LPC database. On May
1994 Texas Instruments borrowed $300 million from a syndicate led by JP Morgan. It borrowed
another $440 million from ABN-AMRO, Citicorp, Fuji Bank and Nations Bank in May 1995.
Then in May 1996 it borrowed $600 million from ABN-AMRO, Citicorp, Fuji Bank and Nations
Bank. Thus, looking back from the point of the May 1997 loan, Texas Instruments contracted
loans of $1340 million (300+440+600) prior to the May 1997 loan of $600 Million. Of the total
past borrowing of $1340, $1040 (440+600) was provided by ABN-AMRO. In this measure we
give full relationship attribution to ABN-AMRO although the loans are syndicated. That is, we
attribute 100% of the loan to every lead bank. This is done as the relationship is established
by the granting of the loan rather than the fraction lent by an individual lead bank. Also in
most cases, LPC does not provide details on the shares of individual banks in a syndicated loan.
Next, we use this example to illustrate the methodology for constructing various relationship
measures.
17We focus on the lead bank(s) on a particular loan facility as the information intensive role being tested in
our hypotheses, is most appropriate for the lead bank who typically holds the largest share of a syndicated loan
(see Kroszner and Strahan (2001)) and is frequently the administrative agent which has the fiduciary duty to
other syndicate members to provide timely information about the borrower. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and
Madan, Sobhani, and Horowitz (1999) list the functions performed exclusively by the administrative agent; these
include monitoring the performance of covenants; relationship management; adminstration of collateral; and loan
workouts in case of defaults. Thus the responsibilities of a lead bank best fit the description of a relationship
lender.
18We chose the 5 year window as approximately 75% of loan facilities in our sample have maturity less than or
equal to 5 years. Thus, most of the borrowers in our sample would need to refinance their debt within 5 years.
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The first relationship strength variable is a binary measure designed to pick up the existence
of prior lending by the same lender in the past. It is denoted by LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm .
In this case, for ABN-AMRO, LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansABN−AMRO would equal 1 denoting existence
of prior lending to Texas Instruments by ABN-AMRO.
The other two measures of relationship strength are continuous. The first continuous measure
of relationship strength LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm captures the size of past lending by bank
m to borrower i. This is calculated as
LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm =
$ Amount of loans to borrower i by bank m in last 5 years
Total $ amount of loans by borrower i in last 5 years
(1)
Thus, in the case of the May 1997 loan to Texas Instruments LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansABN−AMRO
for ABN-AMRO would be 0.776 (calculated by dividing $1040 by $1340).19
The second continuous measure of relationship strength LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm cap-
tures the frequency of past lending by a bank m to a borrower i. It is calculated as
LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm =
Number of loans to borrower i by bank m in last 5 years
Total Number of loans by borrower i in last 5 years
(2)
Thus, in the case of the May 1997 loan to Texas Instruments LOANREL(Number)BankLoans
for ABN-AMRO would be 0.67 (calculated by dividing 2 by 3).20 The construction of LOAN-
REL(M)BankLoansm is depicted in Figure 1.
3.1.2 Market for Underwriting Public Debt
For testing H3 we focus on two investment banking products that a bank can offer to its re-
lationship borrowers. The first product is underwriting services for public debt issues, and
the second product is underwriting services for public equity issues. To examine the impact
of a prior lending relationship on winning a public debt underwriting mandate for any bank
m, we construct a new lending relationship variable LOANREL(M)PublicDebtm in exactly the
same way as LOANREL(M)BankLoansm , the only difference being that for LOANREL(M)
PublicDebt
m
the date of the look-back period is the date of a public issue of debt while for constructing
LOANREL(M)BankLoansm the loan facility activation date was used.
19Because of the fact that we want to capture relationship strength and because of limited data on syndicate
shares we give full attribution to all lending banks.
20For this example LOANREL(M)BankLoansCiticorp and LOANREL(M)
BankLoans
Nations Bank would be the same as those
calculated for ABN-AMRO as both these banks were also lead banks on the two past loans on which ABN-
AMRO was the lead bank.
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Eccles and Crane (1998) argue that prior investment banking relationships have a signifi-
cant impact on winning new investment banking business. Thus, we need to control for the
existence of such prior investment banking relationships in seeking to identify the independent
effect of lending relationships. To better illustrate how we construct prior investment banking
relationships, we use the example of firm i that issues public debt for which we wish to calculate
the strength of prior investment banking relationships (as described in the next section, the
process is the same for an equity issuer). There are two types of investment banking relation-
ship that a bank m can have with the issuer i. The first type is the same-market relationship,
i.e. for any bank m and a debt issuer i, we look for previous debt underwriting relationships
that m has had with i. The second type is the cross-market relationships, meaning that for a
debt issuer i we look to see if i has had a prior equity underwriting relationship with bank m.
We describe the same market relationship measures first. For any debt issuer i, we construct
Lead-DEBTREL(M)PublicDebtm for a bank m in the following way. We take the date of the pub-
lic issue of debt as the starting point and look back over the preceding 5 years to see if bank
m was the “lead-underwriter” to any other public issues of debt by this issuer. Specifically,
Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm would equal 1 if m was a lead underwriter on any previous
debt issue. Similarly, Lead-DEBTREL(Amount)PublicDebtm for bank m reflects the ratio of public
issues of debt underwritten by m (as a lead underwriter) relative to the total number of debt
issues of issuer i over the last five years. It is calculated as:
Lead−DEBTREL(Amount)PublicDebtm =
$ Amount of i ’s public debt underwritten by bank m in last 5 years
Total $ amount of public debt issued by i in last 5 years
(3)
While Lead-DEBTREL(Number)PublicDebtm for underwriter m and debt issuer i is calculated as:
Lead−DEBTREL(Number)PublicDebtm =
Number of i ’s public debt issues underwritten by bank m in last 5 years
Total number of public debt issued by i in last 5 years
(4)
While we focus on lead underwriters, we also construct expanded versions of Lead-DEBT-
REL(M)PublicDebtm variables, denoted by DEBTREL(M)
PublicDebt
m in which we include both “lead-
underwriting” and “co-manager” roles on prior debt issues.
Next, we describe the cross market relationship measures for a debt issuer i. We take
the date of the public issue of debt as the starting point and look back over the preceding 5
years to see if bank m was the “lead-underwriter” to any public issues of equity by this issuer.
Specifically, Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm would equal 1 if m was a lead underwriter
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on any previous equity issue. The calculations of Lead-EQUITYREL(Amount)PublicDebtm and
Lead-EQUITYREL(Number)PublicDebtm are done in the same way. Again, we construct expanded
versions of these cross-market relationship measures (denoted by EQUITYREL(M)PublicDebtm )
by including both the lead underwriting and co-manager roles on previous equity issues. The
methodology for creating various relationship measures for the public debt underwriting market
is illustrated in Figure 2.
3.1.3 Market for Underwriting Public Equity
The process for constructing relationship measures for the public equity underwriting market
is very similar to the one described in section 3.1.2. We separate our equity issuers into IPO
and SEO subsamples as the prior investment banking relationships are not meaningful for the
IPO sample since the issuer is conducting its first sale of securities in the public market.21
However, both IPO and SEO issuers can have prior lending relationships. Thus we estimate
LOANREL(M)PublicEquitym using the date of public issue of equity as the anchor point for the 5
year look-back window. For SEOs the measure for a same-market investment banking relation-
ship (denoted by Lead-EQUITYREL(M)PublicEquitym ) and a cross-market relationship (denoted
by Lead-DEBTREL(M)PublicEquitym ) are constructed in a similar fashion. Again we construct
expanded versions of Lead-EQUITYREL(M)PublicEquitym and Lead-DEBTREL(M)
PublicEquity
m vari-
ables, denoted by EQUITYREL(M)PublicEquitym and DEBTREL(M)
PublicEquity
m in which we include
both “lead-underwriting” and “co-manager” roles on the prior equity and debt issues respec-
tively. Figure 3 illustrates the construction methodology for all of these relationship measures.
The correlations among the various relationship measures are provided in Appendix A2.
Within each market our three relationship measures (Dummy, Number and Amount) have a
strong positive correlation. Across different markets, however, the relationship measure in one
market does not appear to be strongly correlated with relationship measures in other markets.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our data and segregates relationship and non-
relationship loans (i.e. loans from a bank that did not have a past relationship with the borrower
in the previous 5 years). Panel A provides the calendar-time distribution of the loan sample.
The low number of observations in the early years is driven by two factors. First, the LPC
database has had better coverage in more recent years. Second, our methodology for constructing
21While an IPO firm can not have prior equity underwriting relationships, it may still have prior debt under-
writing relationships. However our data showed that firms rarely access the debt market if they do not have a
market in their equity. Thus we assume that prior investment banking relationships are not well defined for IPO
issuers.
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relationship measures ensures that the very first loan reported for any borrower is excluded,
otherwise we would not have a historical starting point to classify a loan as either a relationship
or a non-relationship loan. To control for this time-trend in the sample we include a calendar
year dummy variable in our tests.
We also segregated the samples of public debt issuers and public equity issuers by existence
of prior lending relationships. Panel B and Panel C of Table 1 provide the calendar time
distribution for these issuers.
3.2 Data on Lender (Bank) Characteristics
The higher volume benefits to lenders are hypothesized in H1, H2, and H3, to be in the form
of the ability to supply future loans and investment banking services to borrower. Thus, rela-
tionship benefits to the lender are measured in three complementary ways. First, a strong rela-
tionship implies that the likelihood of providing future loans to relationship borrowers would be
higher. Second, the probability of winning future debt underwriting from relationship borrowers
would be higher. Lastly, the probability of winning future equity underwriting business from
relationship borrowers would be higher.
However, the choice of lender (see H1) would also be affected by the potential lender’s market
share or reputation (all else being equal, a top ranked lender is more likely to be chosen compared
to a lower ranked lender), and the loan’s characteristics. Similarly the probability of winning
investment banking business (see H3) would also depend on the lender’s reputation in the
relevant investment banking product markets.22 Thus, we need data on lender characteristics.
Consequently we use the LPC and SDC databases to gather these data.
For the loan market, a key issue is the identification of the “lead” bank (or banks) for a
particular loan facility. While the LPC database contains a field that describes the lender’s
role, it does not have a uniform and consistent methodology to classify which bank is the lead
bank. It includes a number of descriptions such as “arranger”, “ administrative agent”, “agent”,
or “lead manager” that roughly correspond to the lead bank status of the lender. To ensure
that we do not mislabel the lead bank we follow a simple rule. Any bank(s) that is (are) not
described as a “participant” is (are) treated as a lead bank.23. This approach ensures that we do
22Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2003), show that issuers often switch underwriters to graduate to a more
reputable underwriter.
23For example Walt Disney Co. contracted a $ 1 billion facility on December 19, 1997. Citicorp and Bank of
America with the largest share are listed as Administrative Agents, while all others are listed as Participants.
We classify Citicorp and Bank of America as the lead banks on this facility.
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not include banks that play a limited information production role. Indeed, Madan et al. (1999)
define participant as “the lowest title given to a bank in a syndication” and describe its role as
little more than taking the allocated share of the loan.
The borrower’s choice of lender bank should also depend on the reputation of the lender
and we need to control for this effect. We measure the reputation of a lender by calculating
the market share of that lender (market share is a commonly used proxy for reputation, see
Megginson and Weiss (1991)). Market share is calculated in the following way; if a bank is a
sole lead lender it gets 100% credit for the loan. If there are M lead banks each gets (1/M)th
share of the loan. As noted earlier the LPC database rarely gives the precise shares of lead and
other banks in a loan syndication. To illustrate by an example, if bank m is the sole lead bank
on a loan of $ 100 Million the entire loan amount would be used in calculating its market share,
whereas if bank m was one of 4 lead banks, only $ 25 Million ((1/4)th of $ 100 Million) would
be included in its market share calculation.24 The market share of bank m in any year t as
denoted by (LOAN MKT SHARE)mt is calculated as:
(LOAN MKT SHARE)mt =
(Loan Amount)mt∑N
i=1(Loan Amount)it
(5)
Where (Loan Amount)mt is the dollar amount of loans in year t for which the bank m was the
lead bank. N is the total number of borrowers in the LPC database. Thus while the numerator
captures the lending volume of bank m in year t, the denominator is the “total amount of loans”
raised (by all borrowers) in year t. Panel A of Table 2 provides a list of the top 20 lenders over
our entire sample period, ranked by their market share. This table shows that while no single
bank dominates the sample, the top 20 banks still account for nearly 70% of all loans.
To test H3, we focus on the underwriting business in two distinct markets; issues of public
debt and issues of public equity. While debt underwriting is related to commercial banks’
historical business of corporate lending, e.g. because loan and bond pay-off structures are
similar, equity underwriting is a relatively new market for US commercial banks. We use the
SDC new issues database to get all the public issues of debt and public issues equity by the
borrowers in our sample. This resulted in 5203 distinct issues of debt by 945 firms and 5219
issues of equity by 3129 firms. Next we check if relationship lenders were eligible to underwrite
24For example Bank of Boston was the sole lender on a June 1997, $11.9 million facility to GenRad Inc. and
thus gets 100% credit for this deal while it gave a $350 million line of credit to Boston Scientific Corp on June
10, 1996 along with Chase Manhattan Bank and Lehman Brothers. For this loan, it was given 1/3rd of the credit
while computing market share.
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debt (equity) issues at the date of debt (equity) issue.25 If none of the relationship lenders, at
the date of issue, are eligible to underwrite that issue we exclude that issue from our sample.
Our final sample consists of 3923 distinct issues of debt by 721 firms and 1358 issues of equity
by 895 firms. For these samples we collect the data on amount raised from the debt (equity)
issue, the identity of the lead underwriter(s), and the identity of co-manager(s) of the issue from
the SDC database.
The probability of winning the underwriting business in any particular market would depend
on the reputation of various players in that market. Again, we use the market share of major
underwriters as the proxy for reputation. While the loan market share for each bank is estimated
as in equation 5, we use the SDC database’s league tables to get the data on market share for
major underwriters. Panel B and Panel C of Table 2 provides the list of top-20 underwriters
in debt underwriting and equity underwriting respectively and their relative market share. The
debt and equity underwriting markets appear to be fairly concentrated, as the top-20 institutions
account for over 95 percent of the market.
Finally, in order to control for physical proximity between a bank and a lender (see discussion
in section 3.1), we construct a dummy variable LOCATION that equals 1 if both the bank and
the borrower have their respective head offices in the same state and 0 otherwise. For lenders the
head office location is identified by searching the Hoover’s online company history database and
for borrowers the head office state is identified from Compustat. For non-US banks we searched
for the US headquarters. For a few Japanese banks we were not able to ascertain the exact
location of US headquarters and for these we assumed that New York was the US head office
(we confirmed that all of these banks did have a New York office). For banks that underwent
mergers we used the historical head office for the pre-merger period and the head office of the
new merged entity in the post-merger period.
3.3 Data on Characteristics of Loan Facilities, Debt Issues and Eq-
uity Issues
A primary hypothesis (see H4) we test examines whether strong relationships are associated
with the lender’s ability to use its information monopoly to extract rents through higher prices
25At any given date t, a commercial bank is assumed to be eligible to underwrite a particular class of security
if it has underwritten (either as lead or as co-manager) at least one issue of that class of securities in the period
before t. We could have also used the regulatory approval date as the start of eligibility but in some cases this
date is not available. The requirement of having underwritten at least one deal is thus more conservative and
ensures that only active participants are included.
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for future loans. To do this we first need to control for various loan characteristics such as
maturity, security, type of facility etc. To generate data on loan terms we employed the LPC
database. LPC provides data on a facility level as well as a deal level basis. One given deal may
correspond to multiple facilities (i.e. multiple loan contracts) of different types of loans to the
same firm by one or more banks. Examples of different types of facilities include term loans,
lines of credit, revolvers, etc. In this study, we use each facility as the unit of observation. Panel
A of Table 3 provides summary statistics on key loan facility terms. Also in H4 we test if a
lender charges higher rates and fees on loans to its relationship borrower. The cost of borrowing
variable we use is the “All In Spread-Drawn” (AISD), which is the all-inclusive cost of a drawn
loan to the borrower. This equals the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount plus
fees.26
A lender can also exploit the information “lock-in” effect by charging higher investment
banking fees to its relationship borrower (see H5). The most commonly used measure of in-
vestment banking fees for securities underwriting is the gross spread. For a specific issue it is
calculated by dividing the total fees paid to underwriters by the total proceeds raised from that
security issue.27 The other key characteristics for the debt and the equity issues are proceeds
raised from the issue, date of issuance and identity of lead underwriters and co-managers. Our
primary source for all these data is the SDC new issues database. The summary statistics for
debt issues is provided in Panels B Table 3. We segregate the public equity issues in Initial
Public Offerings (IPOs) and Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) as the fee structure across these
two issue classes is different.
3.4 Data on Borrower Characteristics
Existing theories argue that informational asymmetries between a borrower and potential debt
providers are addressed more effectively by relationship lending than by “arms-length” financing.
Borrowers suffering from greater information asymmetries would gain most from relationship
lending. Thus, such borrowers are expected to borrow from their relationship lender more
frequently (see H2). We use different proxies for information opacity of a borrower such as
borrower size, the loan’s credit rating, and the tangibility of borrower’s assets. COMPUSTAT
26All In Spread-Drawn is the most commonly used measure of borrowing costs. Recent papers that use this
measure include Strahan (2000) and Drucker and Puri (2003).
27More precisely, for debt issues it is the ratio of total fees to the principal amount (face value) of debt.
However, the proceeds and principal are equal for most cases as most bonds are issued at par. In the paper we
use the term “proceeds” for both debt and equity issues for simplicity.
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is our primary data source for borrower related variables. The LPC database does not provide a
borrower Cusip that can be used as an identifier to match the borrower to other data sets such
as the COMPUSTAT or the CRSP. Consequently, we hand match the LPC companies with the
merged CRSP/COMPUSTAT database using the name of the company in the LPC database.
The matching procedure is conservative in that we assign a match only when we are sure that
the company is the same in the two databases. Using this procedure, we are able to obtain a
set of 6322 borrowers in the LPC database for which we can obtain the Cusip of the company
from the COMPUSTAT database. We then use COMPUSTAT to extract data on accounting
variables for the given company. We also extract the primary SIC code for the borrowers from
COMPUSTAT and exclude all financial services firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999). To
ensure that we only use accounting information that is publicly available at the time of a loan
we employed the following procedure: for a loan made in calender year t, we use fiscal year t
data only if the loan activation month is at least 6 months after the fiscal year ending month.
Otherwise, we use fiscal year t-1 data.28 The 6 month minimum gap between fiscal year end
and the loan activation date is conservative given the SEC requirement that accounting data be
made available within 90 days of fiscal year ending. However, compliance with this requirement
is patchy. Fama and French (1992) state “on average 19.8 % percent do not comply (with this
requirement)”.29
4 Methodology and Empirical Results
In this section we describe the tests employed to estimate the hypothesized (volume) benefits of
relationships to lenders (hypotheses H1, H2, and H3) and of the hypothesized pricing benefits
of relationship lending (hypotheses H4, and H5).
28The following examples illustrate this methodology. Walmart contracted a $1.1 billion loan on October 1,
1999. Walmart’s fiscal year ends on January 31 and thus the October loan is more than 6 months after the
month of fiscal year closing. In this case we use the accounting data for fiscal year ending January 31, 1999. On
the other hand, Walmart took a $1.25 billion loan on May 29, 1995. Since the May loan was less than 6 months
after the fiscal year closing we use accounting data for the previous fiscal year, i.e. for the year ending January
31, 1994.
29Even for those firms that do comply, a large proportion file on the last allowed day. Alford, Jones, and
Zmijeweski, 1992, report that more than 40 % of firms with a December fiscal year end file on March 31, thus,
the data becomes available only in April.
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4.1 Tests of H1
As discussed in section 2, existing theories of relationship lending predict that strong relation-
ships should be associated with a lower cost of information production over time, provided this
information is proprietary and reusable. A testable implication of these theories is that a rela-
tionship lender is more likely to get the future lending business of its borrower. We formalize
this implication in our hypothesis 1. To test this, for each loan facility, we focus on any bank
m’s likelihood of winning the loan business of borrower i at time t.
While the number of lenders that appear in our sample is quite large (see Table 2), a handful
of banks account for the bulk of lending. To economize on the size of the data set, but still
retain most of the large transactions, we chose the following approach. In each year, we kept
only those transactions where one of the lead banks was ranked in the top-40 banks by market
share in the prior year. Thus, our sample is reduced to those transactions where the lead bank(s)
was among the top 40 in the previous year. This allows us to retain 73% of our original sample
as the top 40 banks provide the bulk of all loans.30 For each loan we create a choice set of 40
potential lenders, thus creating 40 loan-bank pairs.31 Since each loan facility generates a cluster
of up to 40 loan-bank pair observations, our data set consists of over 400,000 loan-bank pairs
which is the unit of observation in our logit model described below.32
(CHOSEN)m = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
BankLoans
m ) + β2(LOAN MKT SHARE)m
+ β3(LOCATION)m +
∑
βk(CONTROL)k. (6)
The variables are discussed below:
• (CHOSEN)m: For each loan facility i, we create a dummy variable (CHOSEN)m which
takes a value of 1 if a bank m was retained as the lead bank for that loan transaction and
0 otherwise.33
30Even for the 27% of the original sample that is not used, a large fraction (20% of the original) was unusable
regardless of this requirement because these loans were made in the early years of our sample period and we
do not have a long enough history to allow codification of relationship variables. Thus, we only lose 7% of our
sample to the requirement that it must be led by a top-40 bank.
31Drucker and Puri (2003) and Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2003) use a similar approach to implement
their underwriter selection models.
32Since observations within each cluster may not be independent we estimate cluster corrected standard errors
using the approach suggested by Williams (2000).
33Thus, if a bank was the sole lead bank, only the loan-bank pair for this bank would have CHOSEN equal to
1 and for the other 39 CHOSEN would be 0. If the loan facility was led by multiple banks, than all the loan-bank
pairs corresponding to these banks would have CHOSEN equal 1 while it would be 0 for the rest.
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• LOANREL(M)BankLoansm : This is the measure of relationship strength constructed by
looking back over 5 years from the date of the loan facility activation and searching whether
the bank had a prior lending relationship with this borrower. As discussed in section 3.1.1
and Appendix A1, we construct 3 different specifications for this variable to measure the
strength of relationship for each of the 40 banks in each loan bank pair.
• (LOAN MKT SHARE)m: To estimate the probability of winning the loan business by
a particular bank, we need to control for the reputation of that bank in the loan market.
We use its market share as a proxy for reputation. If the loan facility was activated in
the year t, (LOAN MKT SHARE)m is the market share of bank m in the prior year, t-1,
calculated as in equation 5.
• (LOCATION)m: Dummy variable that equals 1 if bank m and the borrower in a loan-
bank pair both have their head offices in the same state and 0 otherwise. We include this
variable to control for the fact that a borrower may be more likely to give repeat business to
a particular bank due to its physical proximity. Since our relationship measure is based on
existence and intensity of past interactions, it may be biased by a non-relationship factor
such as the proximity of a borrower to a particular lender. Including the LOCATION
variable controls for the effect of physical proximity between a borrower and a lender and
partially mitigates this possible bias in our relationship measures.
• (CONTROL)k: We control for borrower’s industry (one digit SIC codes), stated purpose
of the loan facility and the year of the loan facility activation by including dummy variables.
A large number of banking mergers and acquisitions took place during our sample period.
We assume that in the case of acquisitions the customer relationships of a bank being acquired
are inherited by the acquiring bank.34 For mergers, the relationships of the merger partners are
assumed to be inherited by the new post merger entity. We also adjust the market shares to
reflect the M&A activity. Appendix A3 describes these issues in more detail and also provides
an illustrative example.
The results for logit tests of H1 are reported in Table 4. The coefficient for all specifications
of past lending relationships is positive and significant at the one percent level. The panel at
the bottom of the Table illustrates the economic significance of past lending relationships on the
probability of being chosen to provide future loans. We use the model estimated in column (1)
where the past lending relationship is captured simply by existence of (or lack of) prior lending
34This is one of the objectives of bank mergers and acquisitions.
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by the same bank in the last 5 years to calculate these probabilities. The predicted probability of
a bank being chosen as the lender for a loan facility if it did not have a past lending relationship
(i.e. LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoans= 0) holding all other variables constant at their respective
means is 2.73% (bottom panel, first row). We recalculate the predicted probability keeping
all else the same but changing LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoans= 1. The predicted probability of
being chosen for a relationship lender rises to 42.46%.35 Thus, holding all else equal, a bank’s
probability of being chosen to provide a loan is increased by 39.73% if it had a past lending
relationship in the prior 5 years. These results are equally strong if we use continuous measures
(specifications in columns 2 and 3) that take into account both the existence and intensity of past
lending relationships. For example, changing the LOANREL(Number)BankLoans measure from
its minimum value of 0 to its maximum value of 1 increases the probability of being chosen from
3% to 77% , while for LOANREL(Amount)BankLoans this probability is predicted to increase
from 3% to 69%.36
It is important to highlight that other variables have a predicted and significant impact
on the probability of a bank being retained to provide future loans but their economic impact
is smaller compared to the existence of prior lending relationships. As expected, past market
share is strongly associated with ability to win a particular loan mandate. The coefficients
for LOAN MKT SHARE and LOCATION are positive and significant at the one percent level
across all specifications. The bottom panel reports the economic interpretation of these results.
As reported in Table 2, the top ranked lender (Citicorp) had approximately a 10% share of the
loan market over our sample period, while the 20th ranked bank (Wachovia) had approximately
1% market share. To illustrate the impact of a lender’s reputation on its probability of being
retained we calculate predicted probability by first keeping LOAN MKT SHARE equal to 1%
and then changing it to 10%, while all other variables are kept constant at their respective
means. The effect of this is to increase the probability of being chosen from 3% to 9%. Similar
calculations show that the probability of being chosen for a lender that does not have its head
office in the same state as the borrower’s head office (LOCATION = 0) is 3.54% and increases
to 5.08% if both lender and borrower are located in the same state (LOCATION = 1). Again,
35An alternative approach is to interpret the coefficients in terms of increase in odds ratio. Logit
model for a binary dependent variable Y can be written in terms of the odds that Y would equal 1 as
Prob(Y=1)
1−Prob(Y=1) = e
(β′x). Thus the odds of being chosen as a lender as a function of prior lending relationship
is: Prob((CHOSEN)m=1)1−Prob((CHOSEN)m=1) = e
(β0+β1(LOANREL(Dummy)
BankLoans)+
∑
βother(other variables)). The coefficient of 3.27
for LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoans implies that the odds of being chosen as the lender is e3.27 or approximately
26 times higher if a lender had a prior relationship compared to if it did not have a relationship.
36These results are available from the authors on request.
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while significant, this is a much smaller economic effect compared to the one associated with
having (or not having) a past lending relationship. These results suggest that establishing a
lending relationship with a borrower provides significant economic benefits to a lender in terms
of a higher probability of getting the future lending business of that borrower.
4.2 Tests for H2
Theoretical models (e.g. Diamond (1991)) predict that relationships are more beneficial for firms
that suffer from greater informational asymmetries. This motivates our hypothesis 2, that infor-
mationally opaque firms use relationship lenders more frequently. To test this we use different
proxies for information “opaqueness”, specifically, the borrower’s size and the borrower’s credit
rating. These are discussed in subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 below.
4.2.1 The Effect of Borrower Size and H2
A priori, it is reasonable to argue that smaller sized firms are less likely to be widely followed
by either capital market investors (or credit rating agencies). Stein (2002) argues that small-
business lending “relies heavily on information that is soft - that is, information that cannot
be verified by anyone other than the agent who produces it.” This characterization suggests
that smaller borrowers would find strong relationships with their lenders particularly beneficial.
Smaller firms are also likely to be relatively more informationally opaque, for example, Petersen
and Rajan (1994) state: “. . . there may be large information asymmetries between these [small ]
firms and potential public investors”.37 Thus, small firms offer the most potential for proprietary
information generation by a relationship lender. If relationships do mitigate the information
problems faced by smaller firms, we should expect to find a strong association between the size
of a borrower and its use of a relationship bank for future loans.
To examine if relationship lending varies across different borrower sizes, we divide our sample
into three size terciles based on the book value of assets of the borrower. Specifically, we add
two dummy variables MIDDLE and BIG to equation 6. These variables equal 1 if the borrower
37A number of empirical studies use smaller borrower size as proxy for higher information asymmetries, see
for example Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) and Houston and James (1996).
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falls in the stated size tercile and 0 otherwise. We also add two interaction terms multiplying
the relationship variable with MIDDLE and BIG. The modified logit model is described below:
(CHOSEN)m = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
BankLoans
m ) + β2(LOAN MKT SHARE)m
+ β3(LOCATION)m + β4(MIDDLE) + β5(BIG)
+ β6(MIDDLE ∗ LOANREL(M)BankLoansm )
+ β7(BIG ∗ LOANREL(M)BankLoansm ) +
∑
βk(CONTROLk). (7)
The results reported in Table 5, Panel A describe how past lending relationships affect the
probability of winning future lending business across different sized borrowers. Since larger
borrowers are likely to be informationally more transparent, holding everything else constant
we should expect the effect of past relationships on the probability of being chosen as a lender
to be the weakest for the large borrowers and largest for small borrowers. The coefficient of
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm is 5.01 if the borrower is in the smallest size tercile, it reduces to
4.13 for the middle tercile and is lowest at 3.71 for the largest tercile, even as it continues to
be statistically significant across all borrower size terciles (Table 5, column 1). Thus, the effect
of past relationships, while significant, declines as one goes from the smallest borrowers to the
largest borrowers. This is also captured in the negative coefficient of the size and relationship
interaction terms which are negative and significant at the one percent level across all specifica-
tions. In the panel at the bottom of Table 5 we use the specification estimated in column 1 to
illustrate the economic significance of past lending relationship benefits across different borrower
size terciles. Specifically, we estimate the probability of a bank being chosen as the lead lender if
all variables except the relationship variables and the size variables are held equal to their means.
The impact of past relationship on the probability of being chosen as lead lender is measured
by setting each specific size variable equal to 1 while keeping the other size variables equal to
0. The first row reports the predicted probabilities (for borrowers in small, medium and large
terciles) of a bank being chosen as a lead lender if it did not have a past lending relationship
with a borrower LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm =0) and if all other variables are assumed equal
to their means. The next row reports the predicted probability of being chosen if the bank did
have a past lending relationship (LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm =1). We find that having a past
lending relationship increases the probability of being chosen by 63.7% (from 1.2% to 64.9%)
for the borrowers in the smallest tercile. The predicted probability increase for borrowers in the
middle and the largest size terciles is 50.5% (1.7% to 52.2%) and 35.2% (from 4.1% to 39.3%)
respectively. Thus, the probability of a bank being chosen to provide future loans gets smaller
as borrower size increases.
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4.2.2 The Effects of Credit Rating and H2
An alternative proxy for informational asymmetries is the availability of a credit rating for
the borrower. If the borrower is not rated, a debt-holder needs to generate and process a
relatively larger amount of information to make its lending decision. Thus, non-rated borrowers
are more likely to turn to their relationship lender for their financing needs relative to public
debt markets. For example, Diamond (1991) argues that a borrower’s past repayment reputation
would drive its choice of borrowing source. A key prediction of his model is that firms with good
reputations (i.e. with high credit ratings) would be able to issue (cheaper) public debt, while
firms with lower reputations (as evidenced by lower credit ratings) would use bank financing. It
is also frequently argued that the information advantages of an insider lender (scale economies
in information production, better ability to renegotiate covenants, etc.) would allow it to adopt
a more flexible approach towards debt renegotiations. Thus, a relationship bank is expected to
“lean against the wind” when its borrowers face financial difficulties.38 Consequently, a borrower
with a poor credit rating is more likely to use its relationship bank for its borrowing needs.39
Below, we employ the existence and level a of credit rating for a borrower as a proxy for the
information asymmetries faced by that borrower.
To do this we first partition our sample into firms that have a credit rating and those that
do not. We use the credit rating of the loan facility being examined (as reported by LPC) as
the most timely measure of the borrower’s credit worthiness. It is reasonable to assume that
the firms whose loans are not publicly rated, on average, are likely to be less informationally
transparent relative to those that have a rating. Thus, we estimate the model:
(CHOSEN)m = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
BankLoans
m ) + β2(LOAN MKT SHARE)m
+ β3(LOCATION)m + β4(NOT RATED)
+ β5(NOT RATED ∗ LOANREL(M)BankLoansm )
+
∑
βk(CONTROLk). (8)
38Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) provide evidence supporting this view. They report that among the
financially distressed Japanese firms, those with strong banking relationships were better able to maintain their
investment program compared to firms that lacked such banking relationships.
39Anecdotal evidence of the limited benefits of relationship lending to best quality borrowers is highlighted
in an Economist article dated February 12th, 1998, which states: “. . . Part of [JP ] Morgan’s problem is that
its customers are simply too good. The trouble with serving only the best firms is that they typically like to
maintain relationships with at least three banks and play them off against each other to get prices down.”
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The model in equation 8 includes a dummy variable (NOT RATED), which equals one if the
loan is not rated and zero otherwise. We also add an interaction term interacting the relationship
variable with NOT RATED to better isolate the effect of the availability of a credit rating on
the use of a relationship banker for future borrowing.
For the subsample where the credit rating of the borrower is available, we estimate the
following model:
(CHOSEN)m = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
BankLoans
m ) + β2(LOAN MKT SHARE)m
+ β3(LOCATION)m + β4(INV ESTMENT GRADE)
+ β5(INV ESTMENT GRADE ∗ LOANREL(M)BankLoansm )
+
∑
βk(CONTROLk). (9)
INVESTMENT GRADE is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan is rated BBB or
above by S&P and zero otherwise. We also add an interaction term multiplying the relationship
variable with INVESTMENT GRADE to better isolate the effect of credit rating on the use of
relationship banker for future borrowing.
The results of equations 8 are reported in Panel B of Table 5. Consistent with our earlier
finding, that while the existence of a past relationship increases the probability of winning future
loans for all borrowers, this increase is significantly higher for borrowers whose loans have not
been rated. Specifically, the coefficient of 3.19 for LOANREL(Amount)BankLoans if a borrower’s
loan does not have a rating is higher compared to the coefficient of 2.87 for the borrowers with
a rated loan (Table 5, Column 1). The impact of credit ratings is also captured by the positive
and significant (t-value = 18.7) coefficient of the interaction term (multiplying past relationship
with the availability of a borrower’s credit rating). The economic interpretation of these results
is provided in the bottom panel. For a non-rated borrower a relationship lender has a 48%
higher probability (50% vs. 2%) of winning future lending business, while for a rated borrower
the existence of past relationships increases the predicted probability of being chosen for future
loans by 36% (40% vs. 4%). As a result, while the likelihood of being retained for future loans
is fairly low for non-relationship lenders to both non-rated (2%) and rated borrowers (4%),
the probability of a relationship lender being retained by a non-rated borrower is 10% higher
compared to a rated borrower (50% vs. 40%).
Next, we employed the quality of credit rating as a measure of informational transparency of
a borrower as in equation 9. Borrowers with an investment grade rating (rated BBB or above by
S&P) are classified as INVESTMENT GRADE. As discussed earlier, theoretical models predict
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high quality borrowers gain relatively less from borrowing from their relationship lender. Thus,
we expect the effect of relationships to be weaker for borrowers with a high credit rating. The
results reported in Table 5, Panel C provide some weak support for these predictions. The
coefficient on the relationship and investment grade rating interaction term is negative and
significant at the one percent level across all specifications (t- value range of -6.82 to -8.43).
Holding all other variables constant at their means, the existence of a past lending relationship
is associated with a 38% increase (3% to 41%) in the probability of being retained for borrowers
with loans rated below investment grade. For BBB or above borrowers, past relationships
increase the probability of being retained by 34% (5% to 39%).
Taken together our findings in section 4.2 provide strong support for the theoretical predic-
tions underlying H2. That is, informationally opaque firms are more likely to find relationship
borrowing beneficial.
4.3 Tests for H3
In H3 we hypothesized that if there are scope economies in information production, a relationship
lender would have a higher probability of supplying future investment banking/underwriting
services (i.e. this is the cross-product marketing motivation behind lending relationships - see,
for example, Kantas and Qi (2003)).
4.3.1 Tests of H3 and Debt Underwriting
For our empirical tests, we concentrate on two specific investment banking products that a
relationship lender can potentially sell to its existing borrower. The first is the underwriting of
public debt issues and the second is the underwriting of public equity issues (IPOs and SEOs).
From the SDC database we derived details of all the debt and equity issues completed by
the borrowers in our sample, which had at least one relationship lender eligible to provide the
underwriting service (see section 3.2 for our sample selection methodology). For each issue of
public debt in year t (in what follows, the process for equity markets is exactly the same) we
construct a choice set of top-20 financial institutions (ranked by market share of debt under-
writing in the year t-1 ). To this set of 20, we add all the commercial banks (which are not in
the top 20 list) that were eligible to underwrite public issues of debt at the date of the debt
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issue.40 To test if prior lending relationships are associated with a higher probability of winning
an underwriting mandate for issues of public debt, we estimate the following logit model:
(RETAIN)lead−debtm = β0 + β1(PROCEEDS) + β2(LOANREL(M)
PublicDebt
m )
+ β3(Lead−DEBTREL(M)PublicDebtm )
+ β4(Lead− EQUITY REL(M)PublicDebtm )
+ β5(LOAN MKT SHARE)m + β6(TOP TIER−DEBT )m
+ β7(MID TIER−DEBT )m + β8(TOP TIER− EQUITY )m
+ β9(MID TIER− EQUITY )m +
∑
βk(CONTROLk). (10)
The variables are discussed below.
• (RETAIN)lead−debtm : for each debt issue, we create a dummy variable (RETAIN)lead−debtm
that takes a value of 1 if a bank m was retained as the “Lead Underwriter” for that debt
issue transaction and 0 otherwise.41
• PROCEEDS: is the dollar amount of proceeds from the debt issue in $ millions.
• LOANREL(M)PublicDebtm : It is the measure of lending relationship that m has with the
issuer and is constructed in exactly the same way as LOANREL(M)BankLoansm , the only
difference being that for LOANREL(M)PublicDebtm the date of the look-back period is the
date of a public issue of debt while for constructing LOANREL(M)BankLoansm the loan
facility activation date was used.
• Lead−DEBTREL(M)PublicDebtm and Lead−EQUITY REL(M)PublicDebtm : These are rela-
tionship strength measures for debt issue (and equity issue) markets. These measure the
intensity of past investment banking relationships of a bank m in debt underwriting and
equity underwriting markets respectively. Construction of these variables is described in
section 3.1 and Appendix A1.
40That is if it had underwritten (either as lead or as co-manager) at least one debt issue in the years prior to
year t.
41Thus, if a bank was the sole underwriter, only the issue-bank pair for this bank would have RETAIN equal
to 1 and for the other members of the choice set RETAIN would be 0. If the issue was led by multiple banks,
than all the issue-bank pairs corresponding to these banks would have RETAIN equal 1 while it would be 0 for
the rest.
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• (LOAN MKT SHARE)m for each bank m is calculated for the year prior to the year of
debt issue and is calculated as in equation 5.
• (TOP TIER −DEBT )m is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank m is ranked in the
top 5 debt underwriters in the previous year and 0 otherwise.
• (MID TIER − DEBT )m is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank m is ranked from
6th to 15th in debt underwriting in the previous year and 0 otherwise.
• (TOP TIER − EQUITY )m is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank m is ranked in
the top 5 equity underwriters in the previous year and 0 otherwise.
• (MID TIER−EQUITY )m is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank m is ranked from
6th to 15th in equity underwriting in the previous year and 0 otherwise.
We do not include the LOCATION variable for underwriter selection models as most of the
institutions in the choice set of potential underwriters have a New York City head office.
The results reported in Table 6 provide strong support for H3 in the debt issue underwrit-
ing business. The first three columns estimate the effect of a prior lending relationship on the
likelihood of winning the lead underwriter role for future debt issues without controlling for
existing investment banking relationships. The positive and significant coefficients imply that
such lending relationships are associated with an increased probability of winning future debt
underwriting mandates. However, the low value of the Pseudo-R2 suggests that the model does
not describe the data very well. In columns 4 through 6 we include all the prior investment
banking relationship variables and the controls for underwriter reputation both in debt and
equity markets (as described in equation 10). The Pseudo-R2 improves from less than 0.02 to
more than 0.38. The coefficient for LOANREL(M)PublicDebt is still positive and significant at the
one percent level for all specifications.42 Not surprisingly, a prior investment banking relation-
ship in the same market (Lead-DEBTREL(M)PublicDebt) is a strong determinant of future debt
underwriter selection. The economic significance of prior lending relationships and prior debt
underwriting relationships is illustrated in the bottom panel where we use the model specifi-
cation described in column 4 of Table 6 to explore the impact of prior lending and investment
banking relationships. If all variables are held constant at their means and a bank did not have
a past lending relationship (LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebt=0) with a debt issuer, its probability
of being retained as the lead underwriter of that debt issue is 0.29%. This probability increases
42These results are similar to those reported by Yasuda (2004) who also finds that past lending relationships
have significant impact on winning future debt underwriting mandates.
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to 0.55% if the bank had a prior lending relationship (LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebt=1) with the
issuer. While a past lending relationship has a statistically significant impact on the probability
of being chosen as the future debt underwriter, the economic significance (0.55% probability)
is, nevertheless, relatively small. The economic significance of having a past record of providing
(underwriting) the same product is larger but still economically small. This is illustrated by the
change in probability for a bank with and without a prior debt underwriting with the customer
relationship holding all variables constant at their respective means. The existence of a prior
debt underwriting relationship increases the probability of winning the lead underwriter role
(from 0.28% for banks with no prior debt underwriting relationship to 2.61% for banks with
prior debt underwriting relationships). Finally, the existence of a past cross-market investment
banking relationship (Lead- EQUITYRELPublicDebt= 1) is associated with an increase in the
probability of being retained as lead debt underwriter (0.31% to 0.79%). A prior investment-
banking relationship, even in a different product market (equity underwriting), has a positive
relationship with the likelihood of winning future debt-underwriting mandates. Nevertheless,
the economic impact of such cross-market relationships are also small.
Overall, compared to the impact of relationships in the market for loans their impact in the
debt underwriting market is economically weaker.43
4.3.2 Tests of H3 and Equity Underwriting
The second investment banking product we examine is the lead underwriting mandate for issues
of public equity. We segregate our sample of public equity issues into Seasoned Equity Offerings
(SEOs) and Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). This partitioning also allows us to conduct tests of
another aspect of the information production role of relationship lenders. Typically, IPO issuers
suffer from a high degree of information asymmetry. Schenone (2004) states “. . . when firms
go public, the market and the firm are asymmetrically informed about true value of the firm.”
Thus, an underwriter with a strong past lending relationship can provide credible certification
about the true value of an IPO issuing firm. Holding all else constant, it is expected that an
43We also use an alternative underwriting strength definition (RETAIN)PublicDebtm , where this takes the value of
1 if a bank m was retained as either the “Lead Underwriter” or as “Co-Manager” for that debt issue transaction
and 0 otherwise. This more inclusive definition addresses the the fact that even a second-tier underwriting
role offers incremental revenues for the bank. While the overall results (available on request from the authors)
are similar to those in Table 6, the coefficient for LOANREL(M)PublicDebt is almost twice as large across all
specifications. That is, the prior lending relationship variable now has a much stronger association with the
probability of winning a lead-underwriter or a co-manager role.
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IPO issuer is more likely to use its relationship lender as its equity underwriter when compared
to an SEO issuer. We examine this in more detail below.
For SEOs we estimate the logit model described below:
(RETAIN)lead−SEOm = β0 + β1(PROCEEDS) + β2(LOANREL(M)
PublicEquity
m )
+ β3(Lead− EQUITY REL(M)PublicEquitym )
+ β4(Lead−DEBTREL(M)PublicEquitym )
+ β5(LOAN MKT SHARE)m + β6(TOP TIER−DEBT )m
+ β7(MID TIER−DEBT )m + β8(TOP TIER− EQUITY )m
+ β9(MID TIER− EQUITY )m +
∑
βk(CONTROLk). (11)
Since an IPO is the first equity issue by a firm, prior equity underwriting relationships are
not meaningful for IPO issuers. Also, since few IPO firms issue public debt prior to their IPO,
debt underwriting relationships are not common. Thus, for IPOs we estimate the modified logit
model described below.
(RETAIN)Lead−IPOm = β0 + β1(PROCEEDS) + β2(LOANREL(M)
PublicEquity
m )
+ β4(LOAN MKT SHARE)m + β5(TOP TIER− EQUITY )m
+ β6(MIDDLE TIER− EQUITY )m
+
∑
βk(CONTROLk). (12)
(RETAIN)SEOm is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a bank m was retained as
the “Lead Underwriter” for that SEO transaction and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in
Table 7. The first three columns only include lending relationship and loan market reputation
variables. As in the tests for the debt underwriting selection model, while the coefficients
are significant, the model has a poor fit without the investment banking relationship variables
(Pseudo-R2 of 0.01). Columns 4 through 6 report the results for the full model. The coefficient
for LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquity, while positive has low statistical significance, i.e. in one of
three specifications it is insignificant and in another it is only significant at the ten percent
level. The predicted probability of being retained as a lead SEO underwriter for a bank that
did not have a prior lending relationship is 0.30% (holding all other variables constant at their
respective means). This probability essentially remains unchanged at 0.31% if a bank did have a
prior lending relationship (the results are slightly stronger if continuous measures of relationship
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are used with the probability going up from 0.3% to 0.5%). These results suggest that a bank’s
past lending relationship with a borrower is not associated with that bank’s probability of being
retained as a lead SEO underwriter by its relationship borrower.44
As expected, the results for choice of lead IPO underwriter are different from SEOs. As
reported in Table 8, prior lending relationships are associated with a significantly higher prob-
ability of winning the lead IPO underwriting role. As can be seen at the bottom of Table 8, a
bank that had been a lender in the past had a 3-times higher probability of winning the future
IPO underwriting business (rising from 0.48% to 1.81%). However, as with the debt underwrit-
ing, the economic impact is much smaller compared to the impact of such relationships on the
probability of winning future lending business.45
With respect to the other variables in the logit equation, equity underwriting reputation
(TOP TIER-EQUITY) translates into a higher probability of being chosen for the equity un-
derwriting role for both SEOs and IPOs.46 While the effect of a prior equity underwriting
relationship is relevant only for SEOs, similar to the results for debt underwriter selection (Ta-
ble 6), we find that a prior equity underwriting relationship increases the probability of being
retained as lead underwriter of an SEO from 0.3% to almost 3%.
Although lending relationships do have a positive (but economically small) impact on the
probability of generating future investment banking business, overall, the impact of relationships
seems to be considerably stronger in the loan market compared to the public debt or equity
underwriting markets.
44A possible explanation for these results is that since equity underwriting is somewhat removed from tradi-
tional commercial banking business a borrower may feel uncomfortable about rewarding the lead role in SEO
underwriting to its relationship lender. However, it can still provide its relationship lender with incremental
revenues by including it as a second-tier underwriter by awarding it a “co-manager” role. To test this we use
a broader measure of underwriting business (RETAIN)SEOm that equals 1 if bank m gets either the lead under-
writer or a co-manager’s role. Our results (not reported) show that past lending relationships is significantly
associated with ability to win some sort of underwriting role in SEOs (probability of being retained as either lead
or co-manager is 1.7% for a bank lacking past lending relationship and 2.9% for a relationship lender). However,
the economic impact is still small.
45When we use a broader measure of underwriting business (RETAIN)IPOm (that equals 1 if bank m gets
either the lead underwriter or a co-manager’s role), we find (results not reported) significantly higher association
between prior lending relationships and probability of winning an underwriter role on the IPOs. For IPOs, a
relationship lender has a 13.46% probability of getting some sort of underwriting role on the IPO equity issue
compared to 2.03% probability for a bank lacking such a relationship.
46This is similar to the results of Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) who find that issuers often switch
underwriters to graduate to more reputable underwriters
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4.4 Tests of H4
If strong relationships are associated with “customer relationship rent extraction” by relationship
lenders (see H4), the cost of subsequent loans is predicted to be higher – see, for example
Greenbaum et al. (1989), Sharpe (1990), and Rajan (1992). However, Boot and Thakor (1994)
predict that loan rates would decline as a relationship matures. Hence, there are conflicting
predictions as to the level of interest rates (spreads) charged to relationship borrowers.
To examine the impact of lending relationships on loan pricing, we employ a multivariate
regression model of the following form:
AISD = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
BankLoans) + β2(LOCATION)
+
∑
βi(LOAN CHARACTERSTICS)i
+
∑
βj(BORROWER CHARACTERSTICS)j
+
∑
βk(CONTROLk). (13)
The variables in the model are described below.
• AISD: AISD is the ‘All In Spread-Drawn” (AISD), which equals the coupon spread over
LIBOR on the drawn amount plus the annual fee.
• LOANREL(M)BankLoans: A relationship measure described in section 3.1.47
• LOCATION : equals 1 if the head office of the lead bank(s) is located in the same state
as the borrower’s head office.
• (LOAN CHARACTERSTICS)i: Various characteristics of loan facility are described
below:
– MATURITY: Maturity of loan facility in months
– LN(LOAN SIZE): Natural log of loan facility amount.
– SYNDICATE: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan facility was syndicated
and 0 otherwise.
– REVOLVER: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan facility was a revolver and
0 otherwise.
47Since this analysis is done at individual loan facility level rather than at each loan-bank pair level, we need
a single LOANREL(M)BankLoans value. If the facility has a sole lead lender the LOANREL(M)BankLoans for
that bank is used. For loan facilities with multiple lead banks, the LOANREL(M)BankLoans value of each bank
is estimated and the highest value is used.
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– TERMLOAN: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan facility was a term loan
and 0 otherwise.
• (BORROWER CHARACTERSTICS)j: Various characteristics of the borrower as de-
scribed below:
– LN(ASSET): Natural log of the book value of the assets of the borrower.
– LEVERAGE: Ratio of book value of total debt to book value of assets.
– COVERAGE: Calculated as natural log of ratio (1+ EBITDA
Interest Expenses
).
– PROFITABILITY: Ratio of EBITDA to Sales.
– TANGIBILITY: Ratio of Net Property, Plant and Equipment (NPPE) to book value
of assets.
– CURRENT RATIO: Ratio of current assets to current liabilities.
– MARKET TO BOOK: Calculated as ratio of (book value of assets - book value of
equity + market value of equity) to book value of assets.
• (CONTROL)k: These are other control variables and include dummy variables for the
year and the reported purpose of the loan facility and the industry of the borrower (SIC
codes).
The results for equation 13 are reported in Table 9. Regardless of which measure of relation-
ships is used, the coefficient on the relationship variable is negative and significant at the one
percent level. Holding everything else constant, the cost of borrowing from a relationship lender
is lower by 4.48 to 9.54 basis points (bps) compared to borrowing from a non-relationship lender.
Given that the median AISD is 200 bps, existence of a prior relationship implies savings of up to
5 percent of the cost of funds for the borrowers. This suggests that relationship lending is associ-
ated with a lower cost of borrowing, consistent with scale economies in generating (proprietary
and reusable) borrower specific information and the sharing of these benefits with the borrower.
As expected, larger borrower size, high profitability, and higher interest expense coverage of
the borrower are all associated with lower interest rates, while high leverage is associated with
higher cost of borrowing.48
48Interestingly, if both borrowers and lenders have their head office in the same state, the cost of borrowing is
predicted to be higher. These results are similar to those of Degryse and Ongena (2004) who also find that the
close proximity of relationship lender is associated with higher loan rates and Petersen and Rajan (2002) who
document negative association between predicted lender-borrower distance and the interest rate on the loans.
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4.5 Tests of H5
To examine the impact of lending relationship on fees charged for investment banking services,
we first focus on issues of public debt. We estimate a model based on Altinkilic¸ and Hansen
(2000).49
(FEE)PublicDebt = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
PublicDebt) + β2(Lead−DEBTREL(M)PublicDebt)
+ β3(Lead− EQUITY REL(M)PublicDebt) + β4(LOAN MKT SHARE)
+ β5(TOP TIER−DEBT ) + β6(MID TIER−DEBT )
+ β7(TOP TIER− EQUITY ) + β8(MID TIER− EQUITY )
+ β9(1/PROCEEDS) + β10(PROCEEDS/MKTCAP )
+ β11(DEBTV OLUME) +
∑
βS&P (RATING)S&P
+
∑
βk(CONTROLk). (14)
Where (FEE)PublicDebt is the gross spread calculated as the ratio of fees charged to the total
proceeds raised from the debt issue. Since this analysis is conducted at the individual issue level,
the explanatory variables are defined slightly differently. For an issue with a sole underwriter no
modification is needed and all the variables are the same as those defined earlier in the paper.
For an issue that has multiple lead underwriters, the value of a relationship measure in each of
the three product markets (i.e. commercial loan, public debt and public equity) is likely to be
different across all underwriters. For example, if there are three lead underwriters for a debt issue
by borrower i, each underwriter may have a different value for LOANREL(M)PublicDebt depending
on its past lending relationship with the issuer i (the values for Lead-DEBTREL(M)PublicDebt
and Lead-EQUITYREL(M)PublicDebt are also likely to be different across all lead-underwriters).
In such a case, the highest value of the relationship measure across the underwriters for that
issue is assigned to that deal. Similarly, we use the highest value of LOAN MKT SHARE,
TOP TIER DEBT and TOP TIER EQUITY among all the underwriters of that issue for this
analysis. Finally, we include variables used by Altinkilic¸ and Hansen (2000) that capture the
49Altinkilic¸ and Hansen (2000) find strong evidence that gross spreads for both debt and equity underwriting
charged for underwriting have a U-shape. If there are fixed costs for security issuance as well as variable costs
that increase with issue size, one should expect such a U-shape. Initially increase in issue size translates into fixed
cost being spread over a larger amount thus lowering underwriting spreads as issue size gets larger. However,
beyond a certain size the variable costs become large enough and the spreads increase as the issue size gets
bigger.
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U-shape relationship of underwriting fees to issue amount. PROCEEDS is the amount raised in
millions, MKTCAP is the market value of equity of the issuer, DEBTVOLUME is the aggregate
value of all debt issued by industrial firms over the the prior three month period as reported by
SDC and (RATING)S&P are dummy variables for S&P bond rating for the issuer. CONTROL
variables include calendar year dummy variables.
The results are reported in Table 10. The coefficient for LOANREL(M)PublicDebt is positive
and significant regardless of the specification used. The coefficient for LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebt
implies that the fees are almost 15 basis points higher if the issuer chooses to have its relationship
lender underwrite its debt issue. For the median debt issue size of $125 million, the existence
of a prior relationship implies that the debt underwriting fees are almost $187,500 higher.50
The coefficients for Lead-DEBTREL(M)PublicDebt and Lead-EQUITYREL(M)PublicDebt are
positive and insignificant for most specifications. That is, prior investment banking relationships
do not appear to have a significant impact on fees charged on subsequent debt underwriting
services. However, the reputation of the underwriter does have a significant impact on the fees
charged. If a debt issue is underwritten by a top 5 ranked underwriter, the fees are up to 15
basis points lower on average (significant at a 5% level).51
We conduct similar tests focusing on fees (gross spreads) charged for underwriting equity.
Our equity underwriting sample includes both initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity
offerings (SEOs). Since underwriting gross spreads for IPOs are typically higher than for SEOs,
we estimate the impact of prior relationships on underwriting fees for these two subsamples
separately. For SEOs, we estimate the following model (based on Altinkilic¸ and Hansen (2000)):
50The association of past relationships with higher debt underwriting fees is also documented by Burch, Nanada
and Warther (2004) although their focus is on past investment banking relationships. Using a different data set,
Yasuda (2004), finds that fees are lower if debt underwriter has had a prior lending relationship with an issuer.
The difference between our results and Yasuda’s findings can be due to different time period and different model
specification.
51We also conducted the same test with an expanded definition of the investment banking relationship. Thus
DEBTREL(M)PublicDebt and EQUITYREL(M)PublicDebt were defined to include either a lead underwriter or a
co-manager role. The results were largely unchanged and are not reported in order to conserve space and are
available on request from the authors
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(FEE)SEO = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
BankLoans
m ) + β2(Lead− EQUITY REL(M)PublicEquity)
+ β3(Lead−DEBTREL(M)PublicEquity) + β4(LOAN MKT SHARE)
+ β5(TOP TIER−DEBT ) + β6(MID TIER−DEBT )
+ β7(TOP TIER− EQUITY ) + β8(MID TIER− EQUITY )
+ β9(1/PROCEEDS) + β10(PROCEEDS/MKTCAP )
+ β11(EQUITY V OLUME) + β12(V OLATILITY ) +
∑
βk(CONTROL)k.(15)
Most of the variables are the same as those in equation 14. EQUITYVOLUME is the
aggregate amount of all equity offerings by industrial firms over the prior three months as
reported by SDC. VOLATILITY is the daily standard deviation of the returns on common
stock of the issuer and is estimated over the 220 trading day period ending 40 days before the
offering date.
Since some of the variables in Altinkilic¸ and Hansen (2000) model are only applicable for
SEOs, i.e. MKTCAP and VOLATILITY, we use a more compact model for IPO underwriting
fees:
(FEE)IPO = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
PublicEquity) + β2(LOAN MKT SHARE)
+ β3(TOP TIER− EQUITY ) + β4(MID TIER− EQUITY )
+ β5(1/PROCEEDS) + β6(EQUITY V OLUME)
+
∑
βk(CONTROL)k. (16)
We report our findings in Table 11. Panel A reports the impact of prior lending relationship
on the spreads charged for SEOs. The first three columns report the results for a compact model
that only includes prior lending relationship variables. The coefficient is negative (ranging from
-19.84 basis points to -25.16 basis points) and significant at a 5% level.52
The results for IPOs though are quite different than those for SEOs. As reported in Panel B,
the coefficient for LOANREL(M)PublicEquity is negative and significant at the one percent level
across all specifications. The fees charged by an underwriter with a past lending relationship
52However, once we include the prior investment banking relationships, we are reduced to a much smaller
sample (884 to 198) and the prior lending relationship variables are no longer significant. Interestingly, prior
equity investment banking relationships does not have a statistically significant impact on fees charged for SEO
underwriting although the coefficient is negative. Also, the coefficients for equity underwriter’s reputation are
negative but not significant.
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with an issuer is, on average, up to 26 basis points lower (t-value = -2.79). Since the median
IPO size is $96 million, it implies that on average, fees for an IPO issuer are lower by almost
$240,000 if the equity underwriter is also the relationship lender of the issuer.
5 Conclusion
Our paper seeks to measure the direct benefits that a bank-borrower relationship generates for
a lender. For lenders, the establishment of a relationship with a borrower allows for more effi-
cient information production/processing in offering future loans and other information sensitive
products. Consequently a relationship lender is more likely to get the future business of its
borrowers. We find that establishing a relationship with a borrower does indeed increase the
likelihood of getting this borrower’s future loan business significantly - both statistically and
economically. As predicted by theory, the increased likelihood of winning future business is most
powerful for borrowers suffering from the greatest degree of informational asymmetry. We also
find a statistically strong, although an economically small, association between lending relation-
ships and the probability of winning the future debt and equity underwriting business of the
same borrower. Again, consistent with theory, we find that firms conducting IPOs (in contrast
to the firms conducting SEOs) are significantly more likely to use their prior lenders as their
equity underwriters. We find that the rates charged to similar borrowers are significantly lower
for relationship borrowers. While relationship lenders charged higher fees for debt underwriting,
the fee charged for IPO underwriting is lower if a relationship lender is the lead underwriter.
Overall, these results seem to suggest that relationship lenders pass on some of the benefits of
more efficient information processing to their borrowers.
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APPENDIX A1
Methodology for Construction of Relationship Variables
The table below describes how various measures of relationship are constructed. Panel A describes the methodology for constructing
measures that capture existence and extent of prior lending relationship. Panels B and C describe the methodology for constructing
prior investment banking relationship measures.
Relationship Variable Methodology
Panel A: Lending Relationships-Bank Loan and Investment Banking Markets
Binary measure
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm Equals 1 if a bank m had a prior lending relationship with the firm in at least one
loan during the 5 years window preceding the date of activation of current loan.
LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm Same as LOANREL(Dummy)
BankLoans
m , except the look-back window is from the
date of debt issue
LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym Same as LOANREL(Dummy)
BankLoans
m , except the look-back window is from the
date of equity issue
Continuous measure
LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm Ratio of the dollar value of loans contracted by a firm with the lending bank m to
the total dollar value of loans contracted by the firm during the 5 years window
preceding the date of activation of current loan.
LOANREL(Amount)PublicDebtm Same as LOANREL(Amount)
BankLoans
m , except the look-back window is from the
date of debt issue for examining the impact of a lending relationship on ability
to attract underwriting of debt issues.
LOANREL(Amount)PublicEquitym Same as LOANREL(Amount)
BankLoans
m , except the look-back window is from the
date of equity issue for examining the impact of a lending relationship on ability
to attract underwriting of equity issues.
LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm Ratio of the number of loans contracted by a firm with the lending bank m to the
total number of loans contracted by the firm during the 5 years window preceding
the date of activation of current loan.
LOANREL(Number)PublicDebtm Same as LOANREL(Number)
BankLoans
m , except the look-back window is from the
date of debt issue for examining the impact of a lending relationship on ability
to attract underwriting of debt issues.
LOANREL(Number)PublicEquitym Same as LOANREL(Number)
BankLoans
m , except the look-back window is from the
date of equity issue for examining the impact of a lending relationship on ability
to attract underwriting of equity issues.
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Panel B: Investment Banking Relationships - Debt Underwriting Market
Binary measure
Lead−DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm Equals 1 if the bank m had underwritten at least one public debt issue (as
the “Lead-Underwriter”) during the 5 years window preceding the current
debt issue.
Lead− EQUITY REL(Dummy)PublicDebtm Equals 1 if the bank m had underwritten at least one public equity issue (as
the “Lead-Underwriter”) during the 5 years window preceding the current
debt issue.
Continuous measures
Lead−DEBTREL(Amount)PublicDebtm Ratio of the dollar value of public debt issues of a firm underwritten by the
bank m (as the “Lead-Underwriter”) to the total dollar value of public debt
issues by the firm during the 5 years window preceding the date of current
debt issue.
Lead−DEBTREL(Number)PublicDebtm Ratio of number of public debt issues of a firm underwritten by the bank m
(as the “Lead-Underwriter”) to the total Number of public debt issues by the
firm during the 5 years window preceding the date of current debt issue.
Lead− EQUITY REL(Amount)PublicDebtm Ratio of the dollar value of public equity issues of a firm underwritten by the
bank m (as the “Lead-Underwriter”) to the total dollar value of public equity
issues by the firm during the 5 years window preceding the date of current
debt issue.
Lead− EQUITY REL(Number)PublicDebtm Ratio of number of public equity issues of a firm underwritten by the bank
m (as the “Lead-Underwriter”) to the total Number of public equity issues
by the firm during the 5 years window preceding the date of current debt
issue.
Panel C: Investment Banking Relationships - Equity Underwriting Market
Binary measure
Lead− EQUITY REL(Dummy)PublicEquitym Equals 1 if the bank m had underwritten at least one public equity issue (as
the “Lead-Underwriter”) during the 5 years window preceding the current
equity issue.
Lead−DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym Equals 1 if the bank m had underwritten at least one public debt issue (as
the “Lead-Underwriter”) during the 5 years window preceding the current
equity issue.
Continuous measures
Lead− EQUITY REL(Amount)PublicEquitym Ratio of the dollar value of public equity issues of a firm underwritten by the
bank m (as the “Lead-Underwriter”) to the total dollar value of public equity
issues by the firm during the 5 years window preceding the date of current
equity issue.
Lead− EQUITY REL(Number)PublicEquitym Ratio of number of public equity issues of a firm underwritten by the bank
m (as the “Lead-Underwriter”) to the total Number of public equity issues by
the firm during the 5 years window preceding the date of current equity
issue.
Lead−DEBTREL(Amount)PublicEquitym Ratio of the dollar value of public debt issues of a firm underwritten by the
bank m (as the “Lead-Underwriter”) to the total dollar value of public debt
issues by the firm during the 5 years window preceding the date of current
equity issue.
Lead−DEBTREL(Number)PublicEquitym Ratio of number of public debt issues of a firm underwritten by the bank m
(as the “Lead-Underwriter”) to the total Number of public debt issues by the
firm during the 5 years window preceding the date of current equity issue.
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APPENDIX A2
Descriptive Statistics of Relationship Variables
The relationship measures are reported on individual loan facility, debt issue transaction and equity issue transaction basis. The
bank loan market relationship measure on a particular loan facility is estimated by identifying the lead bank(s) on that facility and
then searching over the over the prior 5 years to see if any of the lead bank(s) had been lead banks on any loans during this period.
The LOANREL(M)BankLoans is thus estimated for all the lead banks on the current facility and the highest value across these is
assigned as LOANREL(M)BankLoans for that loan facility. Similar procedure is followed to estimate the relationship variables for
debt and equity issue transactions.
Panel A: Bank Loan Market - Correlations across different relationship measures
(1) (2) (3)
(1) LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoans 1.00
(2) LOANREL(Number)BankLoans 0.89 1.00
(3) LOANREL(Amount)BankLoans 0.87 0.97 1.00
Panel B: Public Debt Underwriting Market - Correlations across different relationship measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Lead -DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicDebt 1.00
(2) Lead -DEBTREL(Number)PublicDebt 0.60 1.00
(3) Lead -DEBTREL(Amount)PublicDebt 0.56 0.94 1.00
(4) Lead -EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicDebt 0.23 0.41 0.46 1.00
(5) Lead -EQUITYREL(Number)PublicDebt 0.25 0.44 0.49 0.94 1.00
(6) Lead -EQUITYREL(Amount)PublicDebt 0.24 0.44 0.49 0.94 0.99 1.00
(7) LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebt -0.06 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.00 1.00
(8) LOANREL(Number)PublicDebt -0.07 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.88 1.00
(9) LOANREL(Amount)PublicDebt -0.07 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.91 0.98 1.00
Panel C: Public Equity Underwriting Market - Correlations across different relationship measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Lead -EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicEquity 1.00
(2) Lead -EQUITYREL(Number)PublicEquity 0.87 1.00
(3) Lead -EQUITYREL(Amount)PublicEquity 0.89 0.98 1.00
(4) Lead -DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicEquity 0.32 0.33 0.31 1.00
(5) Lead -DEBTREL(Number)PublicEquity 0.27 0.37 0.35 0.83 1.00
(6) Lead -DEBTREL(Amount)PublicEquity 0.29 0.37 0.35 0.86 0.99 1.00
(7) LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquity 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.10 1.00
(8) LOANREL(Number)PublicEquity 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.89 1.00
(9) LOANREL(Amount)PublicEquity 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.94 0.97 1.00
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APPENDIX A3
Issues Related to Bank M&A Activity
The high level of M&A activity in the US banking industry during our sample period poses two issues that need to be addressed.
The first issue is how to account for the relationships of banks that are acquired or merged. We assume that in case of acquisitions
all the customer relationships of a bank being acquired are inherited by acquiring bank. For mergers, the relationships of the merger
partners are assumed to be inherited by the new post merger entity. The second issue also arises from the significant consolidation of
banking industry over our sample period. This affects the identity of the top 40 banks, the calculation of bank market share as well
as bank relationships. Several banks that existed in the earlier part of the sample ceased to exist later (due to mergers) or become
relatively unimportant in terms of total loan market share in later years. For example, Manufacturers Hanover which was one of the
largest commercial banks in the late 1980’s merged with Chemical Bank in 1991. Clearly, for loan transactions on or before 1991,
Manufacturers Hanover was an important bank that had a chance of securing the lending business. Post 1991, it no longer existed.
Thus, it is clear that we need to account for the changing identities of potential lead banks for a given loan over time.
We will use the Chemical-Manufacturers Hanover merger discussed above to illustrate how these methodological issues are
addressed. As mentioned before all borrowers that had a lending relationship with either the Old Chemical or the Old Manufacturers
Hanover are assumed to be relationship borrowers of the New Chemical Bank. Next issue is what is the historical market share of
a new bank resulting from a merger or acquisition if it is the first year of operation for this new entity? We address this in the
following way, the historical market share of the new bank is simply imputed from the historical market share of individual banks
that merged (or the shares of the target and the acquiror in case of acquisition). Thus 1992 was the first full operating year for the
New Chemical Bank resulting from merger between Old Chemical and Old Manufacturers Hanover. Since there is no history for this
new bank, the historical market share is calculated by summing the 1991 market shares of Old Chemical and Old Manufacturer’s
Hanover. A related issue is about the choice set of potential lenders in 1992. For illustrative purposes, assume no other mergers
or acquisitions took place in 1991 and that both Old Chemical and Old Manufacturers Hanover were in the top 40 banks in 1991.
Using the methodology discussed earlier both these banks would be in the choice set of potential lenders. However neither of these
two banks exist in 1992 due to the merger, while the New Chemical is very much a potential provider of loans in 1992. This issue
is addressed by assuming as if the New Chemical Bank existed in 1991. This imputed bank would have the market share equal to
the sum of two constituents as discussed above. It also implies that the choice set in 1992 would consist of 39 banks instead of 40
as the two merger partners (in this example - Old Chemical and Manufacturers Hanover) are replaced by single merged entity (in
this example - the New Chemical Bank). If the merger was between a top 40-bank and a non-top 40 bank no adjustment is done,
only the market share needs to be updated and the choice set would still remain 40.
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TABLE 1
Calendar Time Distribution of Loan Facilities, Public Debt Issues and Public
Equity Issues
Panel A below provides the calendar time distribution for the sample of loan facilities, broken in to loans for which none of the
lead banks on the current facility had a prior lead lending relationship in the past 5 years (LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoans=0) and
those for which at least one of the lead banks on the current facility was also the lead lender in the prior 5 years (LOANREL-
(Dummy)BankLoans=1). Panel B provides similar data for public debt issues segregated by LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebt (i.e.
if one of the lead underwriter had a lead lending relationship in 5 years prior to current debt issue). Panel C provides similar
data for public equity issues segregated by LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquity (i.e. if one of the lead underwriter had a lead lending
relationship in 5 years prior to current equity issue).
Panel A :Calendar Time Distribution of Loans
Year of Loan No Relationship Relationship Total
Sanction LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoans= 0 LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoans= 1
1986 1 2 3
1987 67 33 100
1988 222 174 396
1989 237 240 477
1990 212 329 541
1991 222 366 588
1992 373 491 864
1993 404 714 1,118
1994 398 961 1,359
1995 311 1,070 1,381
1996 488 1,207 1,695
1997 543 1,551 2,094
1998 523 1,384 1,907
1999 434 1,293 1,727
2000 348 1,530 1,878
2001Q1 106 464 570
Total 4,889 11,809 16,698
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Panel B :Calendar Time Distribution of Public Debt Issues
Year of Public No Relationship Relationship Total
Debt Issue LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebt = 0 LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebt = 1
1989 48 1 49
1990 71 1 72
1991 98 14 112
1992 197 44 241
1993 187 72 259
1994 119 64 183
1995 182 109 291
1996 240 171 411
1997 349 191 540
1998 341 283 624
1999 139 248 387
2000 129 178 307
2001 92 259 351
Total 2192 1635 3827
Panel C :Calendar Time Distribution of Public Equity Issues
Year of Public No Relationship Relationship Total
Equity Issue LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquity = 0 LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquity = 1
1989 1 0 1
1990 1 0 1
1991 24 0 24
1992 45 2 47
1993 70 13 83
1994 43 10 53
1995 58 10 68
1996 147 30 177
1997 154 31 185
1998 125 47 172
1999 128 80 208
2000 94 68 162
2001 85 64 149
Total 975 355 1330
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TABLE 2
Market Share Ranking of Major Lenders, Debt Underwriters, and Equity
Underwriters
Panel A describes the top 20 lenders for sample period based on data from LPC dealscan database. Panel B and Panel C describe
the top 20 debt and equity underwriters as reported by SDC new issues database.
Panel A: Top - 20 Lenders
Rank Bank Number Market Amount
of Deals share ($ Million)
1 CITICORP 2622 9.72% 429,162
2 BANK-AMERICA 4257 9.44% 416,913
3 CHASE 3102 7.84% 346,470
4 J-P-MORGAN 1347 5.76% 254,320
5 CHEMICAL 1457 5.09% 224,738
6 NATIONS-BANK 2660 4.54% 200,338
7 FIRST-CHICAGO 1298 3.04% 134,310
8 BANKERS-TRUST 1217 2.72% 120,261
9 BANK-NOVA-SCOTIA 1594 2.58% 113,954
10 BANK-ONE 1477 2.31% 101,901
11 BANK-NEW-YORK 1300 2.14% 94,328
12 FIRST-UNION 1556 2.06% 90,885
13 ABN-AMRO 1054 1.85% 81,868
14 DEUTSCHE-BANK 767 1.75% 77,314
15 TORONTO-DOMINION-BANK 886 1.66% 73,362
16 CIBC 1059 1.59% 70,022
17 BANK-BOSTON 1296 1.44% 63,541
18 CREDIT-LYONNAIS 989 1.38% 60,857
19 SOC-GEN 665 1.20% 53,208
20 WACHOVIA 671 1.20% 53,207
Overall 24,174 69.29% 4,417,304
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TABLE 2(CONTINUED)
Panel B: Top- 20 Debt Underwriters
Rank Bank Number Market Amount
of Deals share ($ Million)
1 GOLDMAN-SACHS 640 16.03% 119,331
2 MERRILL 634 14.56% 108,386
3 MORGAN-STANLEY 498 11.38% 84,737
4 CITICORP 319 9.95% 74,119
5 CSFB 371 9.49% 70,660
6 LEHMAN 339 8.81% 65,588
7 SALOMON 310 5.63% 41,895
8 J-P-MORGAN 303 5.28% 39,341
9 BANK-AMERICA 159 4.06% 30,236
10 BEAR-STERNS 109 3.00% 22,309
11 CHASE 132 2.44% 18,167
12 DLJ 89 2.09% 15,544
13 DEUTSCHE-BANK 45 1.04% 7,732
14 UNION-BANK-SWITZERLAND 81 0.97% 7,257
15 SMITH-BARNEY 80 0.89% 6,629
16 BANKERS-TRUST 20 0.46% 3,427
17 NATIONS-BANK 51 0.38% 2,820
18 BANK-ONE 28 0.38% 2,803
19 DILLON-READ 19 0.34% 2,507
20 PAINE-WEBBER 24 0.32% 2,354
Overall 97.48% 744,643
Panel C: Top- 20 Equity Underwriters
Rank Bank Number Market Amount
of Deals share ($ Million)
1 GOLDMAN-SACHS 200 17.05% 47,033
2 MERRILL 236 15.61% 43,082
3 MORGAN-STANLEY 180 15.29% 42,195
4 CSFB 131 9.11% 25,129
5 DLJ 98 5.89% 16,247
6 CITICORP 74 5.86% 16,167
7 J-P-MORGAN 40 5.58% 15,397
8 LEHMAN 88 5.09% 14,051
9 SALOMON 76 4.82% 13,301
10 BEAR-STERNS 57 2.95% 8,148
11 BANK-AMERICA 24 1.43% 3,948
12 SMITH-BARNEY 42 1.41% 3,882
13 BANKERS-TRUST 34 1.32% 3,636
14 ALEX-BROWN 21 1.10% 3,044
15 DEUTSCHE-BANK 26 0.97% 2,665
16 UNION-BANK-SWITZERLAND 22 0.65% 1,802
17 MONTGOMERY 19 0.64% 1,773
18 PAINE-WEBBER 26 0.52% 1,438
19 PRUDENTIAL 19 0.42% 1,169
20 ROBERTSON-STEPHENS 9 0.28% 770
Overall 95.99% 275,927
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TABLE 3
Summary Statistics for Key Loan, Debt Issue and Equity Issue Characteristics
The table below provides summary statistics of various loan and borrower characteristics. Panel A reports these for the Loan
Facilities sample. Panel B and Panel C report these for Debt issue and Equity issue samples respectively. AISD is the “All In
Spread-Drawn”, which is the all-inclusive cost of a drawn loan to the borrower. This equals the coupon spread over LIBOR on the
drawn amount plus the annual fee and is reported in basis points. Loan Facility Size is the dollar amount of loan facility in millions.
Maturity is length in months between facility activation date and maturity date. Syndicate, Secured, and Investment Grade are
percent of facility that have the stated attribute. To be classified as Investment Grade the loan has to be rated BBB or above by
S&P. Proceeds is the amount of proceeds in $ millions from the Debt or the Equity issue. Underwriting fee (i.e. gross spread) is the
fee charged divided by the proceeds and is reported in basis points. All data has been winsorized at the 1 percentile and the 99th
percentile to remove the extreme observations.
Variable N Mean Std. Min 25th Median 75th Max
Dev. Pctile Pctile
Panel A: Loan Facilities Sample
AISD 21,843 211.07 129.64 17.5 100.00 200.00 300.00 580.00
Loan Facility Size 25,476 161.51 312.26 0.50 10.78 50.00 151.70 2000.00
Maturity 22,667 44.42 27.51 3 18.00 37.00 60.00 120
Secured 16,016 0.82 0.38 0 1 1 1 1
Investment Grade 8,484 0.48 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
Syndicate 25,470 0.77 0.42 0 1 1 1 1
Panel B: Debt Issues Sample
Proceeds 3,923 189.81 249.11 0.20 33.0 124.8 249.3 3237.3
Fee (Gross Spread) 3,070 88.80 72.33 0.10 55.00 65.00 87.50 465.00
Panel C: Equity Issues Sample
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
Proceeds 283 200.12 536.04 10.80 51.00 96.00 149.80 7322.40
Fee (Gross Spread) 283 650.96 73.96 250.00 600.00 700.00 700.00 750.00
Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)
Proceeds 1074 204.13 277.05 1.50 63.00 116.50 220.00 2733.70
Fee (Gross Spread) 1012 426.73 114.80 24.80 347.55 448.80 500.75 812.50
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TABLE 4
Impact of Lending Relationships on Probability of Getting Future Lending
Business
This table provides the logit regression estimates of the following equation.
(CHOSEN)m = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
BankLoans
m ) + β2(LOAN MKT SHARE)m
+ β3(LOCATION)m +
∑
βk(CONTROLk).
For each loan facility i we create a choice set of 40 potential lenders, thus creating 40 loan-bank pairs. The top 40 commercial banks
in the previous year form the consideration set for each firm in the current year. The dependent variable (CHOSEN)m that takes a
value of 1 if a bank m was retained as the lead bank for that loan transaction and 0 otherwise. We use 3 proxies for relationship -
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm (equals 1 if there is a relationship with the bank m in the last 5 years before the current loan and 0
otherwise) , LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm (ratio of number of loans with the bank m to total number of loans of the firm in the
last 5 years before the current loan), LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm (ratio of dollar value of loans with the bank m to total dollar
value of loans of the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan). (LOAN MKT SHARE)m is the share of total lending done by
bank m in the year prior to the year of loan facility i. (LOCATION)m is a dummy variable that equals 1 if both bank m and the
borrower have their respective head offices in the same state and 0 otherwise. In the panel at the bottom we illustrate the economic
impact that various variables have on probability of a bank being chosen as the lead lender. We use the specification estimated in
column 1 to estimate probability of a bank being chosen as the lead lender if all variables except the variable being examined are
held equal to their mean. We then estimate the predicted probability as the variable being examined goes from 0 to 1 (except for
LOAN MKT SHARE which is varied from 1% market share (approximately lowest market share of a top 20 lender) to 10% market
share (approximately highest market share of a top 20 lender)). For example, the first row reports the predicted probability of a
bank being chosen as a lead lender if it did not have a past lending relationship with a borrower (LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoans=0)
and if all other variables are assumed equal to their means. The next row reports the predicted probability of being chosen if the
bank did have past lending relationship (LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoans=1) again holding all else constant at their means. The
third row reports the increase in predicted probability of being chosen as the lead lender for relationship lender compared to a lender
with no prior relationship. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors which are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering
(*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at 10 percent level).
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(1) (2) (3)
Const. -3.53∗∗∗ -2.94∗∗∗ -3.32∗∗∗
(.41) (.4) (.42)
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm 3.27
∗∗∗
(.03)
LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm 4.59
∗∗∗
(.04)
LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm 4.23
∗∗∗
(.04)
(LOAN MKT SHARE)m 12.23∗∗∗ 11.37∗∗∗ 11.32∗∗∗
(.21) (.21) (.22)
LOCATION .38∗∗∗ .44∗∗∗ .39∗∗∗
(.05) (.05) (.05)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Dummies Yes Yes
Obs. 416239 416239 416239
Pseudo R2 .32 .31 .32
Impact of past lending relationship on probability of being chosen as the
lead lender using the column (1) specification
Probability of being chosen
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm = 0 2.73%
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm = 1 42.46%
Increase in probability 39.73%
(LOAN MKT SHARE)m= 1% 3.16%
(LOAN MKT SHARE)m= 10% 8.93%
Increase in probability 5.77%
(LOCATION)m= 0 3.54%
(LOCATION)m= 1 5.08%
Increase in probability 1.54%
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TABLE 5
Borrower Information asymmetries, Lending Relationships and Probability of
Getting Future Lending Business
Panel A of this table provides the logit regression estimates of the following equation.
(CHOSEN)m = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
BankLoans
m ) + β2(LOAN MKT SHARE)m + β3(LOCATION)m
+ β4(MIDDLE) + β5(BIG) + β6(MIDDLE ∗ LOANREL(M)BankLoansm )
+ β7(BIG ∗ LOANREL(M)BankLoansm ) +
∑
βk(CONTROLk).
The model is the same as one estimated in Table 4 with one difference, two dummy variables MIDDLE and BIG which take the
value 1 if the borrower falls in the stated size tercile (as measured by the book value of assets) and 0 otherwise have been added.
Also added are two interaction terms, multiplying the relationship variables with MIDDLE and BIG.
Panel B reports the estimates of the following logit regression:
(CHOSEN)m = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
BankLoans
m ) + β2(LOAN MKT SHARE)m + β3(LOCATION)m
+ β4(NOT RATED) + β5(NOT RATED ∗ LOANREL(M)BankLoansm ) +
∑
βk(CONTROLk).
Again, the model is same as the one estimated in Table 4 with an additional variable NOT RATED (and the interaction with
relationship measures) which equals one if the loan is not rated and zero otherwise.
Panel C provides estimates the following logit regression:
(CHOSEN)m = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
BankLoans
m ) + β2(LOAN MKT SHARE)m + β3(LOCATION)m
+ β4(INV ESTMENT GRADE) + β5(INV ESTMENT GRADE ∗ (LOANREL(M)BankLoansm )
+
∑
βk(CONTROLk).
The model is same as the one estimated in Table 4 with an additional variable INVESTMENT GRADE (and the interaction with
relationship measures) which equals one if the loan is rated BBB or above by S&P and zero otherwise.
At the bottom of each panel we illustrate the economic impact of past lending relationships on probability of being chosen as the lead
lender (across borrowers with different levels of information opacity) using the specification estimated in column 1. Specifically, we
estimate probability of a bank being chosen as the lead lender if all variables except the relationship variables and the information
opacity measure (size, credit rating, etc.) are held equal to their mean. Then the impact of past relationship on probability of
being chosen is measured across different information opacity measures for each size tercile (e.g. by setting each size variable equal
to 1 while keeping the other size variables equal to 0). Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors which are corrected for
heteroscedasticity and clustering (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at 10 percent
level).
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Table 5 Panel A: Borrower Size and Relationship Lending
(1) (2) (3)
Const. -4.45∗∗∗ -4.01∗∗∗ -4.3∗∗∗
(.39) (.38) (.4)
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm 5.01
∗∗∗
(.09)
LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm 5.88
∗∗∗
(.13)
LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm 5.7
∗∗∗
(.12)
(LOAN MKT SHARE)m 12.7∗∗∗ 11.97∗∗∗ 11.9∗∗∗
(.21) (.22) (.22)
(LOCATION)m .36∗∗∗ .44∗∗∗ .38∗∗∗
(.05) (.05) (.05)
MIDDLE .37∗∗∗ .41∗∗∗ .39∗∗∗
(.05) (.05) (.05)
BIG 1.26∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗
(.05) (.05) (.05)
MIDDLE x LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm -.88
∗∗∗
(.1)
BIG x LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm -2.3
∗∗∗
(.1)
MIDDLE x LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm -.56
∗∗∗
(.15)
BIG x LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm -1.89
∗∗∗
(.14)
MIDDLE x LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm -.59
∗∗∗
(.13)
BIG x LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm -2.07
∗∗∗
(.13)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 401699 401699 401699
Pseudo R2 .33 .32 .33
Impact of past lending relationship on probability of being chosen as the
lead lender using the column (1) specification
Probability of being chosen
Small Medium Big
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm = 0 1.21% 1.74% 4.14%
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm = 1 64.87% 52.24% 39.28%
Increase in probability 63.66% 50.50% 35.14%
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Table 5 Panel B: Availability of Borrower Credit Rating and Relationship Lending
(1) (2) (3)
Const. -3.2∗∗∗ -2.57∗∗∗ -2.97∗∗∗
(.39) (.38) (.41)
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm 2.87
∗∗∗
(.03)
LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm 4.19
∗∗∗
(.06)
LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm 3.82
∗∗∗
(.05)
(LOAN MKT SHARE)m 12.41∗∗∗ 11.65∗∗∗ 11.58∗∗∗
(.21) (.22) (.22)
(LOCATION)m .37∗∗∗ .45∗∗∗ .39∗∗∗
(.05) (.05) (.05)
NOT RATED -.7∗∗∗ -.7∗∗∗ -.69∗∗∗
(.04) (.03) (.04)
NOT RATED x LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm 1.12
∗∗∗
(.06)
NOT RATED x LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm .97
∗∗∗
(.09)
NOT RATED x LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm 1.06
∗∗∗
(.08)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 416239 416239 416239
Pseudo R2 .32 .32 .33
Impact of past lending relationship on probability of being chosen as the
lead lender using the column (1) specification
Probability of being chosen
Not Rated Rated
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm = 0 1.84% 3.66%
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm = 1 50.31% 40.06%
Increase in probability 48.47% 36.40%
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Table 5 Panel C: Borrower Credit Rating and and Relationship Lending
(1) (2) (3)
Const. -2.98∗∗∗ -2.34∗∗∗ -2.7∗∗∗
(.55) (.53) (.55)
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm 3.18
∗∗∗
(.05)
LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm 4.61
∗∗∗
(.08)
LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm 4.24
∗∗∗
(.07)
(LOAN MKT SHARE)m 13.82∗∗∗ 12.55∗∗∗ 12.58∗∗∗
(.27) (.29) (.29)
(LOCATION)m .39∗∗∗ .45∗∗∗ .39∗∗∗
(.06) (.07) (.07)
INVESTMENT GRADE .52∗∗∗ .49∗∗∗ .51∗∗∗
(.06) (.05) (.05)
INVESTMENT GRADE x LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm -.59
∗∗∗
(.07)
INVESTMENT GRADE x LOANREL(Number)BankLoansm -.75
∗∗∗
(.11)
INVESTMENT GRADE x LOANREL(Amount)BankLoansm -.76
∗∗∗
(.1)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 213420 213420 213420
Pseudo R2 .3 .29 .3
Impact of past lending relationship on probability of being chosen as the
lead lender using the column (1) specification
Probability of being chosen
Non Investment Grade Investment Grade
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm = 0 2.80% 4.64%
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoansm = 1 40.99% 39.08%
Increase in probability 38.19% 34.44%
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TABLE 6
Impact of Lending Relationships on Probability of Getting Future Debt
Underwriting Business
This table provides the logit regression estimates of the following equation.
(RETAIN)Lead−debtm = β0 + β1(PROCEEDS) + β2(LOANREL(M)
PublicDebt
m ) + β3(Lead−DEBTREL(M)PublicDebtm )
+ β4(Lead− EQUITY REL(M)PublicDebtm ) + β5(LOAN MKT SHARE)m
+ β6(TOP TIER−DEBT )m + β7(MID TIER−DEBT )m
+ β8(TOP TIER− EQUITY )m + β9(MID TIER− EQUITY )m +
∑
βk(CONTROLk).
For each debt issue, we create a dummy variable (RETAIN)Lead−debtm that takes a value of 1 if a bank m was retained as the “lead
underwriter” for that debt issue transaction and 0 otherwise. For each debt underwriting deal i we create a choice set of at least
20 potential underwriters, thus creating at least 20 deal-underwriter pairs. The top 20 debt underwriters (based on market share)
from the previous year and all commercial banks eligible to do debt underwriting in the previous year form the consideration set for
each issuer in the current year. For each institution in a transaction-bank pair we estimate relationships across 3 markets: the bank
loan market, the debt underwriting market and the equity underwriting market. Within each market we use 3 different proxies of
relationship strength; for any bank m: LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm (1 if there is a loan relationship with the bank m in the last
5 years before the present debt underwriting transaction and 0 otherwise), LOANREL(Number)PublicDebtm (ratio of number of loan
deals with the bank m to total number of loan deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current debt underwriting transaction),
LOANREL(Amount)PublicDebtm (ratio of dollar value of loan deals with the bank m to total dollar value of loan deals of the firm
in the last 5 years before the current debt underwriting transaction). Similarly, Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm (1 if there is a
debt underwriting relationship in lead underwriter capacity with the bank m in the last 5 years before the present debt underwriting
transaction and 0 otherwise), Lead-DEBTREL(Number)PublicDebtm (ratio of number of debt underwriting deals in lead underwriter
capacity with bank m to total number of debt underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current debt underwriting
transaction), Lead-DEBTREL(Amount)PublicDebtm (ratio of dollar value of debt underwriting deals in lead underwriter capacity with
bankm to total dollar value of debt underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current debt underwriting transaction).
Finally, Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm (1 if there is an equity underwriting relationship in lead underwriter capacity bank m
in the last 5 years before the present debt underwriting transaction and 0 otherwise), Lead-EQUITYREL(Number)PublicDebtm (ratio
of number of equity underwriting deals with in lead underwriter capacity bank m to total number of equity underwriting deals of the
firm in the last 5 years before the current debt underwriting transaction), Lead -EQUITYREL(Amount)PublicDebtm (ratio of dollar
value of equity underwriting deals in lead underwriter capacity with bank m to total dollar value of equity underwriting deals of
the firm in the last 5 years before the current debt underwriting transaction). PROCEEDS is the amount raised in $ millions for
the debt underwriting transaction (reported coefficient has been divided by 1,000). (LOAN MKT SHARE)m is the market share
of the bank m in the loan market, in the year before the current debt underwriting transaction. Similar calculations are done to
estimate market shares for debt underwriting and equity underwriting market. (TOP TIER-DEBT)m and (TOP TIER-EQUITY)m
are dummy variables that equal to 1 if the bank m is ranked in the top 5 debt and equity underwriters respectively and 0 otherwise.
(MID TIER-DEBT)m and (MID TIER-EQUITY)m are dummy variables that equal to 1 if the bank m is ranked from 6th to 15th
in debt and equity underwriting respectively and 0 otherwise.
At the bottom of each panel we illustrate the economic impact of past lending, debt underwriting and equity underwriting relation-
ships on probability of being chosen as the debt underwriter using the specifications estimated in columns 4. The first row reports the
probability of a non-relationship bank (LOANREL(Number)PublicDebt=0) being chosen as the debt underwriter if all other variables
held equal to their mean. The second row reports the probability for a relationship bank (LOANREL(Number)PublicDebt=1) in the
same way. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors which are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering (*** Significant
at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at 10 percent level).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Const. -3.7∗∗∗ -3.71∗∗∗ -3.71∗∗∗ -6.27∗∗∗ -7.06∗∗∗ -6.98∗∗∗
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.2) (.18) (.17)
PROCEEDS .31∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗ .31∗∗∗ .34∗∗∗ .19∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.11) (.06) (.06)
LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm .78
∗∗∗ .66∗∗∗
(.04) (.09)
LOANREL(Number)PublicDebtm 1.58
∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗
(.06) (.12)
LOANREL(Amount)PublicDebtm 1.07
∗∗∗ .86∗∗∗
(.21) (.18)
(LOAN MKT SHARE)m .94 -2.16∗∗ .34 4.51∗∗∗ 3.82∗∗∗ 5.5∗∗∗
(.72) (.9) (1.38) (1.02) (1.08) (1.19)
Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm 2.27
∗∗∗
(.09)
Lead-DEBTREL(Number)PublicDebtm 3.71
∗∗∗
(.16)
Lead-DEBTREL(Amount)PublicDebtm 3.08
∗∗∗
(.13)
(TOP TIER - DEBT)m 2.3∗∗∗ 2.65∗∗∗ 2.75∗∗∗
(.18) (.17) (.17)
(MIDDLE TIER - DEBT)m 2.09∗∗∗ 2.26∗∗∗ 2.3∗∗∗
(.16) (.15) (.15)
Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm .94
∗∗∗
(.08)
Lead-EQUTYREL(Number)PublicDebtm .79
∗∗∗
(.11)
Lead-EQUTYREL(Amount)PublicDebtm .88
∗∗∗
(.11)
(TOP TIER - EQUITY)m .96∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗
(.14) (.13) (.13)
(MIDDLE TIER - EQUITY)m .66∗∗∗ .91∗∗∗ .93∗∗∗
(.12) (.12) (.12)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 206675 206675 206675 77350 77350 77350
Pseudo R2 .01 .02 .02 .4 .4 .38
Impact of past relationships on probability of being chosen as the “lead debt underwriter”
using the column (4) specification
Probability of being chosen
LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm = 0 0.29%
LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm = 1 0.55%
Increase in probability 0.26%
Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm = 0 0.28%
Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm = 1 2.61%
Increase in probability 2.33%
Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm = 0 0.31%
Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicDebtm = 1 0.79%
Increase in probability 0.48%
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TABLE 7
Impact of Lending Relationships on Probability of Getting Future Equity
Underwriting Business - Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)
This table provides the logit regression estimates of the following equation.
(RETAIN)Lead−SEOm = β0 + β1(PROCEEDS) + β2(LOANREL(M)
PublicEquity
m ) + β3(Lead− EQUITY REL(M)PublicEquitym )
+ β4(Lead−DEBTREL(M)PublicEquitym ) + β5(LOAN MKT SHARE)m
+ β6(TOP TIER−DEBT )m + β7(MIDDLE TIER−DEBT )m
+ β8(TOP TIER− EQUITY )m + β9(MIDDLE TIER− EQUITY )m +
∑
βk(CONTROLk).
For each equity issue, we create a dummy variable (RETAIN)Lead−SEOm that takes a value of 1 if a bank m was retained as the
“lead underwriter” for that equity issue transaction and 0 otherwise. For each equity underwriting deal i we create a choice set of at
least 20 potential underwriters, thus creating at least 20 deal-underwriter pairs. The top 20 equity underwriters (based on market
share) from the previous year and all commercial banks eligible to do equity underwriting in the previous year form the consideration
set for each issuer in the current year. For each institution in a transaction-bank pair we estimate relationships across 3 markets:
the bank loan market, the debt underwriting market and the equity underwriting market. Within each market we use 3 different
proxies of relationship strength; for any bank m: LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym (1 if there is a loan relationship with bank m
in the last 5 years before the current equity underwriting transaction and 0 otherwise), LOANREL(Number)PublicEquitym (ratio of
number of loan deals with bank m to total number of loan deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current equity underwriting
transaction), LOANREL(Amount)PublicEquitym (ratio of dollar value of loan deals with bank m to total dollar value of loan deals
of the firm in the last 5 years before the current equity underwriting transaction). Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicEquity(1 if
there is a debt underwriting relationship in lead underwriter capacity with bank m in the last 5 years before the present equity
underwriting transaction and 0 otherwise), Lead-DEBTREL(Number)PublicEquity(ratio of number of debt underwriting deals in
lead underwriter capacity with bank m to total number of debt underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current
equity underwriting transaction), Lead-DEBTREL(Amount)PublicEquity (ratio of dollar value of debt underwriting deals in lead
underwriter capacity with bank mto total dollar value of debt underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current
equity underwriting transaction). Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicEquity(1 if there is an equity underwriting relationship in
lead underwriter capacity with bank m in the last 5 years before the present equity underwriting transaction and 0 otherwise),
Lead-EQUITYREL(Number)PublicEquity(ratio of number of equity underwriting deals in lead underwriter capacity with bank m
to total number of equity underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current equity underwriting transaction),
Lead-EQUITYREL(Amount)PublicEquity (ratio of dollar value of equity underwriting deals in lead underwriter capacitywith bank
m to total dollar value of equity underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current equity underwriting transaction).
PROCEEDS is the amount raised in $ millions for the equity underwriting transaction (reported coefficient has been divided by
1,000). (LOAN MKT SHARE)m is the market share of the bank m in the loan market, in the year before the current equity
underwriting transaction. (TOP TIER-DEBT)m and (TOP TIER-EQUITY)m are dummy variables that equal to 1 if the bank m is
ranked in the top 5 debt and equity underwriters respectively and 0 otherwise. (MID TIER-DEBT)m and (MID TIER-EQUITY)m
are dummy variables that equal to 1 if the bank m is ranked from 6th to 15th in debt and equity underwriting respectively and 0
otherwise.
In addition the regression also includes borrower industry dummies and calendar year dummies.
At the bottom of each panel we illustrate the economic impact of past lending, debt underwriting and equity underwriting rela-
tionships on probability of being chosen as the debt underwriter using the specifications estimated in columns 4. The first row reports
the probability of a non-relationship bank (LOANREL(Number)PublicEquity=0) being chosen as the debt underwriter if all other vari-
ables held equal to their mean. The second row reports the probability for a relationship bank (LOANREL(Number)PublicEquity=1)
in the same way. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors which are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering (***
Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at 10 percent level).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Const. -3.64∗∗∗ -3.66∗∗∗ -3.65∗∗∗ -6.78∗∗∗ -6.79∗∗∗ -6.76∗∗∗
(.007) (.009) (.009) (.38) (.35) (.35)
PROCEEDS .28∗∗∗ .28∗∗∗ .28∗∗∗ .16 .31 .33
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.21) (.21) (.21)
LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym .33
∗∗∗ .02
(.11) (.36)
LOANREL(Number)PublicEquitym .83
∗∗∗ .65∗
(.14) (.38)
LOANREL(Amount)PublicEquitym .6
∗∗∗ .39∗∗
(.2) (.18)
(LOAN MKT SHARE)m -14.2∗∗∗ -16.32∗∗∗ -15.37∗∗∗ -20.13∗∗∗ -21.98∗∗∗ -19.46∗∗∗
(3.76) (3.84) (3.89) (6.9) (6.24) (6.07)
Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym 1.34
∗∗∗
(.21)
Lead-DEBTREL(Number)PublicEquitym 1.89
∗∗∗
(.28)
Lead-DEBTREL(Amount)PublicEquitym 1.92
∗∗∗
(.29)
TOP TIER - DEBT 1.53∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗
(.34) (.33) (.33)
MIDDLE TIER - DEBT .92∗∗∗ .96∗∗∗ .93∗∗∗
(.3) (.31) (.3)
Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym 2.38
∗∗∗
(.22)
Lead-EQUITYREL(Number)PublicEquitym 2.97
∗∗∗
(.27)
Lead-EQUITYREL(Amount)PublicEquitym 2.97
∗∗∗
(.26)
TOP TIER - EQUITY 2.36∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗
(.43) (.43) (.43)
MIDDLE TIER - EQUITY 2.09∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗
(.37) (.37) (.37)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 57465 57465 57465 12310 12310 12310
Pseudo R2 .006 .008 .007 .47 .48 .49
Impact of past relationships on probability of being chosen as the “lead SEO underwriter”
using the column (4) specification
Probability of being chosen
LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym = 0 0.30%
LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym = 1 0.31%
Increase in probability 0.01%
Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym = 0 0.29%
Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym = 1 1.09%
Increase in probability 0.80%
Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym = 0 0.28%
Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym = 1 2.95%
Increase in probability 2.67%
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TABLE 8
Impact of Lending Relationships on Probability of Getting Future Equity
Underwriting Business - Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
This table provides the logit regression estimates of the following equation.
(RETAIN)Lead−IPOm = β0 + β1(PROCEEDS) + β2(LOANREL(M)
PublicEquity
m ) + β4(LOAN MKT SHARE)m
+ β5(TOP TIER− EQUITY )m + β6(MIDDLE TIER− EQUITY )m +
∑
βk(CONTROLk).
For each equity issue, we create a dummy variable (RETAIN)Lead−IPOm that takes a value of 1 if a bank m was retained as the “lead
underwriter” for that IPO equity issue transaction and 0 otherwise. The model is a reduced version of the one estimated for SEOs
in Table 7. We dropped the investment banking relationship variables as these are not meaningful for firms conducting an IPO. At
the bottom of each panel we illustrate the economic impact of past lending, debt underwriting and equity underwriting relationships
on probability of being chosen as the debt underwriter using the specifications estimated in columns 4. The first row reports the
probability of a non-relationship bank (LOANREL(Number)PublicEquity=0) being chosen as the debt underwriter if all other vari-
ables held equal to their mean. The second row reports the probability for a relationship bank (LOANREL(Number)PublicEquity=1)
in the same way. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors which are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering (***
Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at 10 percent level).
(1) (2) (3)
Const. -6.25∗∗∗ -6.23∗∗∗ -6.23∗∗∗
(.22) (.22) (.22)
PROCEEDS .27∗∗∗ .3∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗
(.09) (.08) (.08)
LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym 1.34
∗∗∗
(.34)
LOANREL(Number)PublicEquitym 1.52
∗∗∗
(.39)
LOANREL(Amount)PublicEquitym 1.44
∗∗∗
(.38)
(LOAN MKT SHARE)m -11.2∗∗ -10.39∗ -10.27∗
(5.41) (5.41) (5.37)
TOP TIER - EQUITY 4.21∗∗∗ 4.18∗∗∗ 4.19∗∗∗
(.24) (.24) (.24)
MIDDLE TIER - EQUITY 2.99∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗ 2.98∗∗∗
(.24) (.24) (.24)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 15112 15112 15112
Pseudo R2 .24 .24 .23
Impact of past relationships on probability of being chosen as the “lead IPO underwriter”
using the column (1) specification
Probability of being chosen
LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym = 0 0.48%
LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquitym = 1 1.81%
Increase in probability 1.33%
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TABLE 9
Lending Relationships and Cost of Borrowing.
This table provides the OLS estimates of the following equation.
AISD = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
BankLoans) + β2(LOCATION) +
∑
βi(LOAN CHARi)
+
∑
βj(BORROWER CHARj) +
∑
βk(CONTROLk).
The dependant variable AISD is the the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount plus the annual fee. LOANREL(M)BankLoans
is the measure of relationship strength between the lead bank of the loan facility and the borrower (for loan facilities with multiple
lead banks, the maximum LOANREL(M)BankLoans value among the lead banks is used). It is estimated in 3 different ways-
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoans(1 if there is a relationship with the bank in the last 5 years before the present loan and 0 otherwise),
LOANREL(Number)BankLoans(ratio of number of deals with the bank to total number of deals of the firm in the last 5 years before
the current loan), LOANREL(Amount)BankLoans(ratio of dollar value of deals with the bank to total dollar value of deals of the
firm in the last 5 years before the current loan). LOCATION is a dummy variable that equals 1 if both the lender and the borrower
have their respective head offices in the same state. Maturity is length in months between facility activation date and maturity
date. LN(Loan Size) is the natural log of the loan facility size. Syndicate, Revolver and Term loan are dummy variables that equal
one if the facility has the stated attribute and zero otherwise. LN(Assets) is the natural log of book value of assets of the borrower
as reported in the COMPUSTAT. Leverage is the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of assets. Coverage is the ratio
of EBITDA to interest expenses. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to Sales. Tangibility is the ratio of NPPE to Total Assets.
Current Ratio is the ratio of Current Assets to Current Liabilities. Market to book is the ratio of (Book value of assets-Book value of
equity+market value of equity) divided by book value of assets. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors which are corrected
for heteroscedasticity (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at 10 percent level).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Const. 449.59∗∗∗ 422.06∗∗∗ 450.11∗∗∗ 421.86∗∗∗ 449.83∗∗∗ 421.58∗∗∗
(30.63) (30.55) (30.73) (30.62) (30.71) (30.6)
LOANREL(Dummy)BankLoans -9.54∗∗∗ -7.39∗∗∗
(2.43) (2.39)
LOANREL(Number)BankLoans -6.85∗∗∗ -4.95∗∗
(2.4) (2.38)
LOANREL(Amount)BankLoans -6.48∗∗∗ -4.48∗
(2.4) (2.37)
(LOCATION) 20.64∗∗∗ 21.02∗∗∗ 21.03∗∗∗
(2.55) (2.56) (2.55)
Maturity -0.001 -.008 -0.001 -.008 -0.001 -.008
(.009) (.008) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.008)
LN(Loan Size) -14.01∗∗∗ -13∗∗∗ -14.13∗∗∗ -13.09∗∗∗ -14.12∗∗∗ -13.09∗∗∗
(1.22) (1.23) (1.22) (1.23) (1.23) (1.23)
Syndicate -15.86∗∗∗ -13.08∗∗∗ -16.19∗∗∗ -13.3∗∗∗ -16.16∗∗∗ -13.29∗∗∗
(4.08) (4.09) (4.08) (4.09) (4.08) (4.09)
Revolver .63 1.01 .7 1.07 .67 1.05
(3.05) (3.04) (3.05) (3.04) (3.05) (3.04)
Termloan 40.14∗∗∗ 40.92∗∗∗ 40.07∗∗∗ 40.87∗∗∗ 40.04∗∗∗ 40.84∗∗∗
(3.72) (3.7) (3.72) (3.7) (3.73) (3.7)
LN(Assets) -20.71∗∗∗ -20.08∗∗∗ -20.9∗∗∗ -20.22∗∗∗ -20.88∗∗∗ -20.2∗∗∗
(1.03) (1.03) (1.03) (1.03) (1.03) (1.03)
LN(1+coverage) -25.63∗∗∗ -25.34∗∗∗ -25.68∗∗∗ -25.39∗∗∗ -25.71∗∗∗ -25.41∗∗∗
(1.41) (1.4) (1.41) (1.4) (1.41) (1.4)
Leverage 28.01∗∗∗ 31.15∗∗∗ 27.54∗∗∗ 30.81∗∗∗ 27.5∗∗∗ 30.76∗∗∗
(6.08) (6.07) (6.07) (6.06) (6.07) (6.06)
Profitability -28.59∗∗∗ -27.73∗∗ -28.61∗∗∗ -27.75∗∗ -28.61∗∗∗ -27.76∗∗
(11.05) (11) (11.06) (11.01) (11.06) (11.01)
Tangibility -18.8∗∗∗ -17.73∗∗∗ -18.86∗∗∗ -17.75∗∗∗ -18.83∗∗∗ -17.74∗∗∗
(5.03) (5.02) (5.03) (5.02) (5.03) (5.02)
Current Ratio -1.36∗ -1.5∗∗ -1.38∗ -1.52∗∗ -1.37∗ -1.51∗∗
(.75) (.74) (.75) (.74) (.75) (.74)
Market to Book -3.82∗∗∗ -3.67∗∗∗ -3.81∗∗∗ -3.67∗∗∗ -3.83∗∗∗ -3.69∗∗∗
(1.17) (1.15) (1.17) (1.16) (1.17) (1.16)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 9709 9709 9709 9709 9709 9709
R2 .49 .49 .49 .49 .49 .49
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TABLE 10
Impact of Lending Relationships on Fees Paid For Debt Underwriting Business
This table provides the OLS regression (corrected for heteroscedasticity) estimates of the following equation.
(FEE)PublicDebt = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
PublicDebt) + β2(Lead−DEBTREL(M)PublicDebt)
+ β3(Lead− EQUITY REL(M)PublicDebt) + β4(LOAN MKT SHARE)
+ β5(TOP TIER−DEBT ) + β6(MID TIER−DEBT ) + β7(TOP TIER− EQUITY )
+ β8(MID TIER− EQUITY ) + β9(1/PROCEEDS) + β10(PROCEEDS/MKTCAP )
+ β11(DEBTV OLUME) +
∑
βS&P (RATING)S&P +
∑
βk(CONTROLk).
(FEE)PublicDebt is the gross spread calculated as ratio of fees charged divided by the total proceeds raised from the debt issue
expressed in basis points. We estimate relationships across 3 markets: the bank loan market, the debt underwriting market and
the equity underwriting market. LOANREL(Dummy)PublicDebt (1 if there is a loan relationship with the underwriting bank in the
last 5 years before the present equity underwriting transaction and 0 otherwise), LOANREL(Number)PublicDebt (ratio of number
of loan deals with the underwriting bank to total number of loan deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current equity
underwriting transaction), LOANREL(Amount)PublicDebt (ratio of dollar value of loan deals with the underwriting bank to total
dollar value of loan deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current equity underwriting transaction). For issues in which
multiple underwriters have past lending relationships, the highest value is used. Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicDebt(1 if there
is a debt underwriting relationship in lead underwriter capacity with the underwriter (commercial bank or investment bank) in
the last 5 years before the present debt underwriting transaction and 0 otherwise), Lead-DEBTREL(Number)PublicDebt(ratio of
number of debt underwriting deals in lead underwriter capacity with the underwriter (commercial bank or investment bank) to
total number of debt underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current debt underwriting transaction), Lead-
DEBTREL(Amount)PublicDebt (ratio of dollar value of debt underwriting deals in lead underwriter capacity with the underwriter
(commercial bank or investment bank) to total dollar value of debt underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current
debt underwriting transaction). For issues in which multiple underwriters have past debt underwriting relationships, the highest
value is used. Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicDebt(1 if there is an equity underwriting relationship with the underwriter in lead
underwriter capacity (commercial bank or investment bank) in the last 5 years before the present debt underwriting transaction
and 0 otherwise), Lead-EQUITYREL(Number)PublicDebt(ratio of number of equity underwriting deals with the underwriter in lead
underwriter capacity (commercial bank or investment bank) to total number of equity underwriting deals of the firm in the last
5 years before the current debt underwriting transaction), Lead -EQUITYREL(Amount)PublicDebt (ratio of dollar value of equity
underwriting deals with the underwriter in lead underwriter capacity (commercial bank or investment bank) to total dollar value
of equity underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current debt underwriting transaction). For issues in which
multiple underwriters have past equity underwriting relationships, the highest value is used. (LOAN MKT SHARE) is the highest
loan market share (across all underwriters of the current issue) in the year before the current debt underwriting transaction. Similar
calculations are done to estimate market shares for debt underwriting and equity underwriting market. (TOP TIER-DEBT) and
(TOP TIER-EQUITY) are dummy variables that equal to 1 if the highest rank across underwriters of current issue lies in the
top 5 debt and equity underwriters respectively and 0 otherwise. (MID TIER-DEBT)m and (MID TIER-EQUITY)m are dummy
variables that equal to 1 if the highest rank of across underwriters of current issue lies between 6th to 15th in debt and equity
underwriting respectively and 0 otherwise. PROCEEDS is the amount raised in $ millions for the equity underwriting transaction
(reported coefficient has been divided by 1000), MKTCAP is the market value of equity of the issuer as of the time of offering.,
DEBTVOLUME is the aggregate value of all debt in $ millions issued by industrial firms over the the prior three month period
as reported by SDC (reported coefficient has been divided by 1000). In addition to the variables reported, the regression also
includes dummy variables for the bond rating classes. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors which are corrected for
heteroscedasticity (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at 10 percent level).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Const. 116.93∗∗∗ 117.24∗∗∗ 117.32∗∗∗ 163.56∗∗∗ 161.63∗∗∗ 162.01∗∗∗
(14.65) (14.65) (14.66) (26.05) (26.26) (26.27)
LOANREL(Dummy))PublicDebt 10.09∗∗∗ 12.03∗∗∗
(1.87) (3.38)
LOANREL(Number))PublicDebt 12.53∗∗∗ 16.11∗∗∗
(2.08) (4.12)
LOANREL(Amount))PublicDebt 12.43∗∗∗ 15.83∗∗∗
(2) (3.77)
LOAN MKT SHARE -56.37 -57.77 -60.67 -62.26 -78.6 -80.38
(43.17) (43.54) (43.33) (92.18) (94.32) (92.6)
TOP TIER - DEBT -14.81∗ -14.5∗ -15.46∗
(8.45) (8.51) (8.42)
MIDDLE TIER - DEBT -9.22 -7.8 -8.53
(7.9) (7.96) (7.89)
Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicDebt -4.01
(3.18)
Lead-DEBTREL(Number)PublicDebt 4.49
(3.96)
Lead-DEBTREL(Amount)PublicDebt 6.42
(3.92)
TOP TIER - EQUITY 15.05∗∗ 14.94∗∗ 14.62∗∗
(6.6) (6.5) (6.44)
MIDDLE TIER - EQUITY 12.09∗∗ 10.65∗∗ 10.13∗
(5.33) (5.28) (5.27)
Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicDebt 4.59
(2.99)
Lead-EQUITYREL(Number)PublicDebt .34
(3.19)
Lead-EQUITYREL(Amount)PublicDebt -.05
(3.28)
1/(PROCEEDS) -13.6 -13.32 -12.81 -1.06 -1.64 -.86
(14.31) (14.14) (13.97) (11.19) (11.31) (10.94)
(MKTCAP)/(PROCEEDS) .03 .02 .02 .03 .03 .03
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.02)
DEBTVOLUME .59∗∗ .58∗∗ .59∗∗ .66 .62 .64
(.28) (.28) (.28) (.5) (.5) (.5)
Bond Rating Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2770 2770 2770 959 959 959
R2 .66 .66 .66 .69 .69 .69
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TABLE 11
Impact of Lending Relationships on Fees Paid For Equity Underwriting Business
This table provides the OLS regression (corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering) estimates of spreads charged by equity
underwriters. Panel A reports the results for Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) and Panel B provides the estimates for Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs). The two models estimated are:
(FEE)SEO = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
PublicEquity) + β2(Lead− EQUITY REL(M)PublicEquity)
+ β3(Lead−DEBTREL(M)PublicEquity) + β4(LOAN MKT SHARE) + β5(TOP TIER−DEBT )
+ β6(MID TIER−DEBT ) + β7(TOP TIER− EQUITY ) + β8(MID TIER− EQUITY ) + β9(1/PROCEEDS)
+ β10(PROCEEDS/MKTCAP ) + β11(EQUITY V OLUME) + β12(V OLATILITY ) +
∑
βk(CONTROL)k.
(FEE)IPO = β0 + β1(LOANREL(M)
PublicEquity) + β2(LOAN MKT SHARE) + β3(TOP TIER− EQUITY )
+ β4(MID TIER− EQUITY ) + β5(1/PROCEEDS) + β6(EQUITY V OLUME) +
∑
βk(CONTROL)k.
(FEE) is the gross spread calculated as ratio of fees charged divided by the total proceeds raised from the equity issue expressed
in basis points. We estimate relationships across 3 markets: the bank loan market, the debt underwriting market and the equity
underwriting market. LOANREL(Dummy)PublicEquity (1 if there is a loan relationship with the underwriting bank in the last
5 years before the present equity underwriting transaction and 0 otherwise), LOANREL(Number)PublicEquity (ratio of number
of loan deals with the underwriting bank to total number of loan deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current equity
underwriting transaction), LOANREL(Amount)PublicEquity (ratio of dollar value of loan deals with the underwriting bank to total
dollar value of loan deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current equity underwriting transaction). For issues in which
multiple underwriters have past lending relationships, the highest value is used. Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicEquity(1 if there
is a debt underwriting relationship in lead underwriter capacity with the underwriter (commercial bank or investment bank) in
the last 5 years before the present debt underwriting transaction and 0 otherwise), Lead-DEBTREL(Number)PublicEquity(ratio of
number of debt underwriting deals in lead underwriter capacity with the underwriter (commercial bank or investment bank) to
total number of debt underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current debt underwriting transaction), Lead-
DEBTREL(Amount)PublicEquity (ratio of dollar value of debt underwriting deals in lead underwriter capacity with the underwriter
(commercial bank or investment bank) to total dollar value of debt underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current
debt underwriting transaction). For issues in which multiple underwriters have past debt underwriting relationships, the highest
value is used. Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicEquity(1 if there is an equity underwriting relationship with the underwriter in
lead underwriter capacity (commercial bank or investment bank) in the last 5 years before the present debt underwriting transaction
and 0 otherwise), Lead-EQUITYREL(Number)PublicEquity(ratio of number of equity underwriting deals with the underwriter in
lead underwriter capacity (commercial bank or investment bank) to total number of equity underwriting deals of the firm in the
last 5 years before the current debt underwriting transaction), Lead -EQUITYREL(Amount)PublicEquity (ratio of dollar value of
equity underwriting deals with the underwriter in lead underwriter capacity (commercial bank or investment bank) to total dollar
value of equity underwriting deals of the firm in the last 5 years before the current debt underwriting transaction). For issues in
which multiple underwriters have past equity underwriting relationships, the highest value is used. (LOAN MKT SHARE) is the
highest loan market share (across all underwriters of the current issue) in the year before the current equity underwriting transaction.
Similar calculations are done to estimate market shares for debt underwriting and equity underwriting market. (TOP TIER-DEBT)
and (TOP TIER-EQUITY) are dummy variables that equal to 1 if the highest rank across all underwriters of current issue lies in
the top 5 debt and equity underwriters respectively and 0 otherwise. (MID TIER-DEBT) and (MID TIER-EQUITY) are dummy
variables that equal to 1 if the highest rank of across underwriters of current issue lies between 6th to 15th in debt and equity
underwriting respectively and 0 otherwise. PROCEEDS is the amount raised in millions (reported coefficient has been divided by
1000), MKTCAP is the market value of equity of the issuer as of the time of offering. EQUITYVOLUME is the aggregate value of
all equity issued by industrial firms over the prior three month period as reported by SDC (reported coefficient has been divided by
1000). VOLATILITY is the daily standard deviation of the returns on common stock of the issuer and is estimated over the 220
trading day period ending 40 days before the offering date. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors which are corrected for
heteroscedasticity (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at 10 percent level).
67
Table 11 Panel A: Equity Underwriting - Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Const. 365.43∗∗∗ 363.74∗∗∗ 363.95∗∗∗ 276.87∗∗∗ 260.62∗∗∗ 261.22∗∗∗
(14.76) (14.85) (14.86) (49.51) (47.23) (47.5)
LOANREL(Dummy))PublicEquity -25.16∗∗∗ 10.82
(7.68) (14.38)
LOANREL(Number))PublicEquity -20.34∗∗ 7.36
(8.55) (16.16)
LOANREL(Amount))PublicEquity -19.84∗∗ 8.62
(8.18) (15.21)
LOAN MKT SHARE -15.14 -73.5 -66.21 27.47 67.22 54.51
(210.11) (214.07) (213.78) (359.6) (365.92) (374.32)
TOP TIER - EQUITY -17.93 -20.18 -23.81
(43.23) (41.56) (42.32)
MIDDLE TIER - EQUITY -21.08 -22.51 -25.16
(37.93) (36.96) (37.4)
Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)PublicEquity -22.54
(17.24)
Lead-EQUITYREL(Number)PublicEquity -23.97
(19.63)
Lead-EQUITYREL(Amount)PublicEquity -17.51
(18.94)
TOP TIER - DEBT 10.99 14.96 16.22
(26.12) (25.14) (25.19)
MIDDLE TIER - DEBT 20.09 24.75 25.81
(23.25) (23.02) (22.87)
Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)PublicEquity -.61
(18.26)
Lead-DEBTREL(Number)PublicEquity -9.45
(21.25)
Lead-DEBTREL(Amount)PublicEquity -11.11
(19.98)
1/(PROCCEDS) .64 .66∗ .66∗ 4.63∗∗∗ 4.63∗∗∗ 4.65∗∗∗
(.39) (.4) (.4) (1.24) (1.21) (1.22)
(MKTCAP)/(PROCEEDS) .47 .48 .47 .57 .59 .52
(.34) (.34) (.34) (.38) (.38) (.38)
VOLATILITY 1.82∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗
(.19) (.18) (.19) (.43) (.45) (.45)
EQUITYVOLUME 1.46∗ 1.51∗ 1.5∗ 1.9 2.09 2.03
(.87) (.87) (.87) (2.35) (2.43) (2.43)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 884 884 884 198 198 198
R2 .33 .32 .32 .42 .42 .42
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Table 11 Panel B: Equity Underwriting - Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
(1) (2) (3)
Const. 521.72∗∗∗ 521.12∗∗∗ 521.37∗∗∗
(12.59) (12.62) (12.61)
LOANREL(Dummy))PublicEquity -26.12∗∗∗
(9.36)
LOANREL(Number))PublicEquity -19.62∗∗
(9.59)
LOANREL(Amount))PublicEquity -21.43∗∗
(9.49)
LOAN MKT SHARE -4.87 -5.35 -5.31
(3.37) (3.48) (3.44)
TOP TIER - EQUITY -7.07 -7.04 -7.21
(8.86) (8.82) (8.82)
MIDDLE TIER - EQUITY .38 1.26 .84
(9.81) (9.69) (9.77)
1/(PROCCEDS) 3.1∗∗∗ 3.17∗∗∗ 3.15∗∗∗
(.6) (.61) (.61)
EQUITYVOLUME -1.29 -1.49 -1.42
(1.51) (1.52) (1.51)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 278 278 278
R2 .4 .39 .39
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Figure 1: Construction of Relationship Measures in Bank Loan Market
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Figure 2: Construction of Relationship Measures in Public Debt Underwriting Mar-
ket
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Figure 3: Construction of Relationship Measures in Public Equity Underwriting
Market
1/1/99
Date of 
Public 
Equity
issue
1/1/94
Search if bank m lead bank on any loans during this 
period. If m was the lead bank on any loan, then                                        
1/95 1/96 1/97 1/98
5-year look-back window
,  Lead-DEBTREL(M)
PublicEquity
m
LOANREL(Dummy)                    =1PublicEquitym
Construction of lending and investment banking relationship measure for 
a bank m assuming current public equity issue takes place on 1/1/1999
LOANREL(M)
PublicEquity
m
and Lead-EQUITYREL(M)
PublicEquity
m
•
Search if bank m lead underwriter on any public debt
issue during this period. If m was the lead underwriter 
on any debt issue, then                                        
•
Search if bank m lead underwriter on any public equity 
issue during this period. If m was the lead underwriter 
on any equity issue, then                                       
•
Lead-DEBTREL(Dummy)                    =1PublicEquitym
Lead-EQUITYREL(Dummy)                    =1PublicEquitym
Illustrations:
72
